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Abstract
Argentina is the most decentralized country in Latin America, with approximately 50 %
of total public spending occurring at the subnational level.  At the same time, it has a
high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance.  From 1985 to 1995, an average of only 35% of
provincial expenditures were financed by taxes collected directly by the authorities of
each province, while the remaining 65% were financed from taxes collected by national
(federal) authorities.  The process by which these taxes, once collected nationally, are
then allocated between the national government and across the provinces, is generically
referred to as “Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos” (federal tax-sharing agreement).
The first such regime dates from 1934 and the current law dates from 1988.
Throughout the years, the underlying legal  framework of the tax sharing system was
repeatedly altered and it has been the source of numerous conflicts.  These  periodic
modifications led to a current situation where the whole system has reached a high level
of complexity.  As many observers have shown, this intricate scheme (christened “fiscal
labyrinth”) does not correspond with any economic criteria, and provides all sorts of
perverse incentives for the provincial leaders to overexploit the common pool of national
taxation.
The question we address in this paper is why did the political actors make a collection
of choices that produced a system that, in the view of all experts, is clearly inefficient.
We  suggest  an  explanation  based  on  the  transaction  costs  of  Argentina’s  political
market.  Although everybody would have preferred to share a bigger pie than a smaller
pie, it turned out that a big (and guaranteed) piece of a small pie today was perceived by
several actors at different points in time to be better than an uncertain piece of a bigger
pie tomorrow.  Thus, potentially Pareto-improving policies were not introduced because
of the uncertainty over the future status of  today’s  bargains,  and  given  the  lack  of
institutions to enforce bargains among the political actors.
The paper concludes offering some preliminary ideas for institutional engineering: what
governance structures could help reduce  these  transaction  costs?  The  purpose  is  to
create  an  institutional  framework  in  which  political  actors  could  negotiate  among
themselves, ensuring the enforceability of agreements, in order to achieve more efficient
outcomes.3
Introduction
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and an autonomous district,
Buenos Aires City. Still, the main agent responsible for the collection of most taxes at
the provincial level is the federal government.  Most taxes are collected nationally and
then allocated between the federal government and across the provinces. This transfer
scheme is generically referred to as “Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos”  (federal
tax-sharing agreement). The first such regime dates from 1934, and throughout the years
it has been repeatedly altered. As a result of these successive modifications,  the  tax
sharing system has evolved throughout the years into an intricate scheme. According to
many  observers,  its  current  configuration  does  not  correspond  with  any  economic
criteria,  and  provides  all  sorts  of  perverse  incentives  for  the  provincial  leaders  to
overexploit the common pool of national taxation.
The question we want to address in this paper is why did the political actors
make a collection of choices that eventually produced a system that can be judged as
inefficient from an economic point of view. This inquiry is naturally related to a long-
standing  concern  in  political  economy:  the  efficiency  or  inefficiency  of  income
redistribution.
Recent  studies  have  revitalized  such  debate,  focusing  on  the  ability  of  the
political process to produce Pareto-efficient  outcomes.  This  literature  has  promoted
many healthy discussions about the inefficiency of policies and institutions, as well as
some interesting arguments for a transaction-cost theory of politics.
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Our aim, thus, is to contribute to those debates  by  analyzing  the  history  of
federal fiscal relations in Argentina. The argument developed in this paper is that time
consistency problems, asymmetric information and other special forms of transaction
costs impeded Argentina’s political leaders to move towards more efficient outcomes.
We believe that the evolution of Argentina’s federal fiscal arrangements offers a
natural ground for this kind of study, because fiscal issues are at the heart of the State
(one of the main actors in any political-economy analysis);
2 and because sub-national
governments provide natural actors for a political transaction-cost analysis.
3 Not only
are some of the key actors easy to  identify,  but  also  the  welfare  effects  of  budget
allocations are somewhat easier to recognize and measure than those of, say, regulatory
policy or trade policy.
The study of the Argentine case could also be taken as a contribution to  the
economic theory of federalism. Some authors have recently stressed the incentive effects
of decentralized authority (Weingast, 1995; Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995; Qian
and Weingast, 1996 and 1997). Paralleling arguments in the theory of the firm,  they
suggest how the features of federalism provide credible commitment to secure economic
                                                
1 A good introduction to the discussion about the efficiency  of  redistribution is  given  in  Robinson
(1998). The pioneer application of  the “transaction-cost” logic to study the policy-making process  is
North (1990b). It is worth noting, though, that “transaction costs” do not provide a single analytical
framework, but only a loose conceptual background for organizing many analytical models.
2 Some of the most important work in modern political economy has tended to move swiftly from general
theoretical discussion to fiscal applications.  Inman (1987) provides an excellent survey and overview of
this “general-fiscal” political economy literature.
3 This is a good point to announce that even though a large part of the analysis will take the “provinces”
as actors, we believe that many of the relevant transaction costs in this matter relate  to principal-agent
problems between citizens and government officials.4
rights and enhance economic development.  Even though this paper is clearly inscribed
in this literature it raises new questions. The argument that is made here is that despite
the positive effects of federalism and decentralization of authority pari passu, there are
certain features of this type of institutional arrangements that can also lead to incentive
problems among the different jurisdictions and negatively affect economic performance.
This paper is a first step in a research agenda where we will attempt to identify
the relevant political transaction costs that led to this inefficient social outcome. Our
main  tasks  will  be  to  “unbundle”  the  blanket  category  of  “transaction  costs”  into
empirically verifiable elements. Then, we will walk through the history of Argentina’s
federal  fiscal  arrangements  looking  for  evidence  of  those  elements.  These  elements
include incomplete and asymmetric information, time consistency problems (inability to
commit), coordination costs, political opportunism (holdup problems), thinking costs,
mental models, ideology, etc.
It is worth noting that a political history of federal relations in Argentina in this
century has not been written yet.
4 So, even if  our  final  interpretation  is  faulty,  we
believe that at least we will contribute with some evidence about this crucial axis of the
political, economic and institutional history of Argentina.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I offers a brief review of the recent
literature on redistributive politics and economic inefficiency. Section II, after a brief
introduction to fiscal federalism, provides a picture and critique of Argentina’s current
Federal Tax-Sharing regime. Section III contains a sketch of the history of tax-sharing
agreements in Argentina. Section IV suggests some principles that help to unbundle the
“transaction-cost”  argument  into  categories  relevant  for  the  Argentine  case.  Finally,
section V  provides some preliminary suggestions for institutional reforms  that  could
generate governance structures conducive to reduce the incidence of transaction costs.
I. Relation to the Literature.
There is no clear consensus in the political economy literature on  the  ability  of  the
political process to produce Pareto-efficient economic outcomes. That  is,  to  allocate
resources in such a way that all gains form trade are exhausted and that no one can be
better off without someone else being worse off.  As Dixit notes, this would be the case
if the workings of the political process conform to the ideal benchmark of the Coase
theorem (1960), so that no policy that can benefit some group of people without hurting
others goes unconsummated and no Pareto improvement goes unrealized (Dixit 1996:
38-39).
Some  economists  (for  example,  Wittman  1989  and  1995)  argue  that  the
redistributions we observe in the real world -- while reflecting underlying distributions
of power --, are (constrained) Pareto efficient 
5.
Still, recent studies have made an opposing argument, claiming that the political
process might fail to implement policies that could make all individuals better off given
the available instruments of redistribution (Coate and Morris 1995, Dixit and Londregan
                                                
4 The closest is the book by Sawers (1996).
5 Initially we also mentioned Becker (1983) as another  example. We thank Professor  Gary  Becker  for
pointing us out that what his paper  really  claims is that taxes, not necessarily  subsidies, tend to be
efficient.  In Becker and Mulligan (1996), they argue that it may be in the interest of taxpayers to promote
inefficient subsidies to discourage political action by subsidy recipients.5
1995, Dixit 1996). According to these authors, redistributions to special interests (for
example, the support to declining industries) are especially harder to interpret within an
“efficiency” view of politics.
The traditional explanation of why declining industries are inefficiently protected
is based on Olson’s logic of collective action (1965) and (1982): small groups with large
individual stakes could organize and obtain benefits at the expense of a large number of
disorganized actors with small individual stakes. Still, as Dixit (1996) contends, a closer
look at this argument indicates that the underlying  theoretical  reasons  for  inefficient
policies must lie in considerations such as asymmetric information, time consistency
problems and other special  forms  of  transaction  costs  (otherwise,  again,  a  Coasian
result should obtain).
The  sub-field  of  information  economics  has  emphasized  the  importance  of
informational limitations on the workings of the economy in the past three decades. As
Stiglitz notes, market equilibria with imperfect or incomplete information are generally
not  constrained  Pareto  efficient  (1997:  29).  Similarly,  in  many  cases  economic
inefficiency caused by redistributive politics is also rooted in informational problems.
This  view  has  traditionally  been  associated  with  the  “Virginia  school”  of  political
economy: given that citizens are poorly informed about the effects of different policies,
politicians  can  select  inefficient  and  “sneaky”  methods  of  redistribution  over  more
transparent and efficient ones in order to provide benefits to special interests. Yet, this
argument can be criticized by pointing out that in such case,  enterprising  politicians
would have an incentive to inform the voters and offer the beneficial policies in order to
gain their support (Wittman 1989; Dixit and Londregan 1995).
Coate and Morris (1995) have recently presented a more compelling argument.
They contend that inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed when voters
have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of
politicians. The example they present is the following: suppose there is a public project
that is beneficial to a special interest but also, under certain conditions might enhance the
welfare of citizens. A problem arises because when citizens see the realization of the
project they cannot tell whether the politician is acting in their interest or simply making
transfers to the special interest. Their model suggests that if politicians are all identical
and known to be so, the transfers to special interests will be made efficiently. Yet, if
politicians differ from each other (in terms of, say, honesty) and their types are not
perfectly observable to citizens, then transfers to the special interest might be  made
inefficiently.
This literature also suggests explanations to the phenomenon of  economically
inefficient redistributions based on the dynamic inconsistency of the political process.
Dixit and Londregan (1995), for example, developed a model where the anticipation of
future political success makes workers stay in declining industries. They argue that even
if there is an efficient solution to the problem of a declining industry from an economic
point of view (compensate the workers for the capitalized value of their losses in a lump
sum, and then leave them to find and take up their best alternative opportunities), the
political process will fail to implement such policy. Politicians are not going  to offer
such capital sums up front because the recipients cannot credibly promise their political
support over the period that spans the duration of their prospective income loss, so
compensations will take the form of a gradual stream of payments. The problem is that6
under this transfer scheme, the workers will have to make the decision on whether to
relocate or not, knowing that once they have moved, elected officials may renege on their
promises and discontinue the flow of future installments. Consequently, in anticipation
of this, the workers’ moving decision will dilute and, thus, the declining industry will be
partially or totally locked in.
Therefore, the fact that in a representative democracy elected officials  cannot
make binding agreements about future policy is another reason why politicians might
not always choose the most efficient method of redistributing incomes.
Moe (1990) made a related point. He contended that political property rights are
especially insecure in democratic regimes, because programs that are put in place by one
generation of politicians are subsequently subject to reversal when incumbents are voted
out of office. According to him, thus, inefficiencies are intentionally created in the public
sector as a means by which to achieve program persistence and/or to obtain political
support for programs that would otherwise be defeated.
Similarly,  Besley  and  Coate  (1998)  have  pointed  how  the  problem  of  time
consistency  may  lead  political  actors  to  overlook  economically  efficient  policies.
According to them, political turnover  may  hinder  the  implementation  of  potentially
Pareto-improving public investments for three reasons: i) because of fears that future
compensation needed  to  cover  current  costs  will  not  be  delivered;  ii)  because  such
projects may change the identities of future decision-makers; iii) because such projects
may change the policy choices of future decision-makers.
What  all  of  these  accounts  have  in  common,  thus,  is  that  they  explain  the
adoption of inefficient policies (or the failure to implement Pareto-improving ones) as a
result of the inability of citizens and policy-makers to reach binding agreements about
future policy.
As Besley and Coate point out, the undertakings of such bargains might seem
utopian  given  the  transaction  costs  involved  (1998:  153).  Generally,  the  exchanges
involved are made over time, are difficult to specify in advance, involve different people
at different times, and need to accommodate a shifting distribution of resources. Thus, it
is tremendously difficult to carry out their enforcement (Weingast and Marshall, 1988;
North, 1990b).
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In the rest of this paper we describe the Argentine federal fiscal system and the
political dynamics behind it, attempting to identify  the  relevant  political  transaction
costs.
II. Argentina’s Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement
                                                
6 On top of the problems associated with the time dimension of political transactions emphasized in the
text, “transaction-cost politics” also stresses  the cognitive difficulties  involved in  the  policy-making
process. In order to reach the alleged “Coasian” bargains, policy-makers should also be able to know the
connection between the policies they adopt and the effects they desire. Still, political actors do not choose
policy outcomes, but rather policies whose effects on outcomes are, usually, uncertain and realized over
time (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998a and 1998b).  As North (1990b) suggests, those who participate in
politics frequently use erroneous models of the world to guide their actions, and the information feedback
they receive is usually not sufficient to cause them to revise their initially incorrect theories (1990b: 356).
Moreover,  ideologies (a  “hodge-podge of  beliefs,  myths,  sound  theories  and  dogmas”)  underlie  the
subjective models these actors’ posses to explain the world around them.7
A. Brief Refresher on Fiscal Federalism
The  literature  on  fiscal  federalism  suggests  several  economic  rationales  for
intergovernmental transfers:
7
A.   Addressing  vertical  fiscal  imbalances.  Intergovernmental  transfers  are  needed  to
balance  the  budget  at  the  sub-national  levels  in  situations  in  which  (as  in  most
countries) the national government retains the major tax bases while an  important
fraction of government functions pertain to sub-national governments. The rationale
behind decentralized spending functions relates to the superior  capability  of  local
governments to deliver public goods and services better attuned to local demands and
needs, as well as the increased political control  by  local  citizens.
8    The  rationale
behind relatively centralized taxation relates to economies of scale and to the mobility
of tax bases.
9
B.   Addressing horizontal fiscal imbalances. On the one hand, some jurisdictions  may
have better access to natural resources or other tax bases that are not available in
others. They may also have higher income levels than those in other jurisdictions.
These are referred to as differences in fiscal capacities.  On the other hand, some
jurisdictions  may  have  extraordinary  expenditure  needs,  because  they  have  high
proportions of poor, old, and/or young inhabitants, or because they need to maintain
national airports and harbors.  The net fiscal benefit, measured by the gap between
fiscal capacity and fiscal need, is often caused by such uncontrollable factors and
therefore should be addressed by central government transfers.
10
C.   Addressing interjurisdictional spillover effects.  Some public services have spillover
effects (externalities) on other jurisdictions.  Examples are pollution control, inter-
regional highways, higher education, etc.  Without reaping all the benefits of these
projects, a local government tends to underinvest in such projects.  Therefore, the
central government may provide incentives or  financial  resources  to  address  such
problems of underprovision.
11
An effective transfer system should satisfy  several  criteria  (Shah,  1995;  Ma,
1997):
                                                
7 See for instance Ma (1997), Rosen (1995) and Shah (1994).
8 This view, although predominant, is not shared by all analysts.  See for instance Prud’homme (1995)
and Tanzi (1996) for some words of caution.
9 It is also related, to a lesser extent, with better administrative capabilities of central governments. This
point is contestable, since one can argue that many local governments never had the incentives to develop
those tax capabilities, which does not necessarily imply prohibiting costs of developing them.  (Hence,
the surviving part of the argument may fold back into “economies of scale”.)
10 A weaker version of this argument states that the central government has the obligation of maintaining
a minimum standard of public service in all the sub-national units.  Regions without sufficient resources
to reach this minimum should be subsidized.
11 The reasons enumerated sidestep the related question of the optimal size of political jurisdictions (see
for  instance  Cooter,  1998).    It  is  worth  mentioning  that  most  of  the  economic  arguments  for
“decentralization of spending” seem to apply to fairly small units, closer to Argentine municipalities than
provinces.  In section IV we refer to some “political” arguments in favor of larger political units, such as
provinces. An investigation  of  a  “transaction-cost/path-dependence”  versus  an  “efficiency”  theory  of
provinces would be a very useful study. Cortés Conde and McCandless (1997) provide some preliminary
insights for the Argentine case.8
A.   Revenue  adequacy:  the  sub-national  authorities  should  have  sufficient  resources,
with the transfers, to undertake the designated responsibilities.
B.   Local  tax  effort  and  expenditure  control:  ensuring  sufficient  tax  efforts  by  local
authorities.  The  transfer  system  should  not  encourage  fiscal  deficits  (or,  more
generally, “suboptimal fiscal efforts”.)
C.   Equity: transfers should vary directly with local fiscal needs and inversely with local
fiscal capacity.
D.   Transparency and  stability:  the  formulas  should  be  announced  and  each  locality
should be able to forecast its  own  total  revenue  (including  transfers)  in  order  to
prepare its budget; and the formulas should be sufficiently stable to allow long-term
planning at the local level.
As we describe below, there is an almost absolute consensus among observers that the
Argentine tax-sharing system is very far from satisfying the normative properties just
enumerated (even when compared to regimes in place in other countries, not only with a
normative ideal).
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B. The Argentine Case
Argentina  is  the  most  decentralized  country  in  Latin  America  in  terms  of  public
spending,  with  approximately  50%  of  its  total  occurring  at  the  sub-national  level
(Interamerican Development Bank, 1997).
13  At the same time, Argentina has a  high
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. From 1985 to 1995, an average of 65% of provincial
expenditures  were  financed  through  transfers  from  a  common  pool  of  nationally
collected taxes, with  only  35%  financed  from  direct  own-provincial  revenues.    The
importance of the transfer mechanisms as determinants of provincial fiscal behavior is
obvious.  As  Figure  1  shows,  there  is  a  high  variation  around  this  35%  (weighted)
average.
14  Ten provinces finance less than 15% (and sixteen provinces less than 20%)
of their spending with their own resources.
The Argentine Constitution establishes that the federal government will employ
tariffs  on  foreign  trade  to  finance  its  expenditures,  while  provinces  will  finance
themselves through taxes on production and the consumption of specific goods.  Over
time, however, for economic and political reasons, the national government became the
main agent responsible for the collection of most taxes at the  provincial  level.    The
process by which these taxes, once collected, are then re-allocated to the provinces has
been the source of numerous conflicts and modifications.  Argentina’s first national tax-
                                                
12  See,  for  instance,  Aizenman  (1998),  Bird  (1993),  Fundación  de  Investigaciones  Económicas
Latinoamericanas  (1992), Porto (1990), Piffano  (1998), Interamerican  Development  Bank (1997),  and
World Bank (1992) and (1996).
13 If we exclude the pension system, provincial plus municipal spending in 1997 was twice as large as
spending by the federal government (Piffano, 1998).
14 The simple average is just 23%, the difference being explained by the fact that the larger provinces (like
Buenos Aires) tend to have smaller imbalances.9
sharing agreement (“Ley de Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos) dates from 1935.
15
Periodically new tax laws have been written to regulate this distribution. The current law
dates from 1988. It established that the federal government would retain 42% of these
taxes while 57% were to be distributed among the provinces, with the remaining 1% set
aside “to finance unforeseen crises in the provinces.”
16 The  law  also  establishes  the
percentages of the secondary distribution, and is supplemented by several other laws
regulating the distribution and destination of some specific taxes that finance a set of
predetermined activities.
Some of the main features of the 1988 tax sharing scheme prevail today, even
though there have been numerous changes and adjustments.  One of the main changes
was to establish “precoparticipaciones,” that is, to redirect parts  of  the  tax  revenue
originally destined to the tax-sharing scheme toward other purposes. (For instance, in
1992 and 1993 the national government was able to achieve a 15% reduction  of  the
amount to be shared with the provinces, in order to finance the growing social security
deficits.)  Another important change was to provide some fixed-sum transfers  and  a
minimum transfer guarantee to the provinces. Another factor was the decentralization of
many educational and health services since 1992.  This was to be financed by a transfer
equivalent to the estimated cost of the services transferred.  According to World Bank
(1996), the tax-sharing system has reached a high level of complexity, not corresponding
with any economic criteria.  In the next subsection we list the main “defects” that the
literature has identified in the current working of the Argentine tax-sharing agreement.
The 1994 Constitution established that a new Coparticipation Law had to be
sanctioned before the end of 1996, but that deadline was postponed until the end of
1998, a date at which a new law has not been produce either.  The discussions currently
under way (documented in  Palanza  and  Sin-Silva,  1998)  could  be  interpreted  as  an
indication of the “transaction cost” nature of this crucial institutional decision.
C. Incentive Problems in the Current Argentine Regime
This section provides a listing of  some  of  the  main  criticisms  directed  towards  the
Argentine tax-sharing regime.  
1. Lack of “Fiscal Correspondence”:
The high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in Argentina, coupled with the  relatively
large fraction of government services provided at the sub-national level, contributes to
create a common pool problem across provinces.  This induces provincial governments
to behave as if they did not  face  a  hard  budget  constraint,  increasing  spending  and
reducing local tax effort with respect to the values that would obtain if they faced a hard
budget constraint.  
                                                
15 These laws define  the share  of  specified  taxes to be transferred  from  the central  government  to the
provinces  (“primary distribution”) and the way  in which these funds  are  to be allocated  among  the
provinces (“secondary distribution”).
16  In  practice,  these  funds,  called  National  Treasury  Contributions  (ATNs)  are  distributed  in  a
discretionary way by the National Executive, through the Ministry of the Interior (the “political” ministry
par excellence).10
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1998) and (1999) provide (indirect) empirical
evidence on these “common pool” incentive effects induced by the tax-sharing regime.
They show: (1) that the larger provinces “internalize” more the federal tax cost of their
spending;  (2)  that  the  provinces  that  are  more  favored  by  the  “secondary
coparticipation” (beyond the mere devolution  of  the  taxes  collected  by  the  national
government in the province) are more  inclined  to  fiscal  profligacy;  and  (3)  that  the
national  executive  is  able  to  discipline  the  governors  from  their  same  party  into
internalizing some of these costs.
17  
2.  The Bailout Problem:  
The “bailout problem,” could be thought of as a dynamic version of the common-pool
problem. It refers to the fact that higher levels of government are likely to bail-out lower
levels  of  government  in  financial  distress,  generating  a  moral  hazard  problem  that
undermines  the  incentives  of  lower  units  to  behave  in  fiscally  responsible  ways.
(Interamerican Development Bank, 1998).
Many  observers  have  argued  that  the  Argentine  federal  fiscal  system  is
particularly  vulnerable  in  this  dimension,  providing  poor  incentives  for  provincial
governments and even for creditors (see, for instance, Piffano 1998).
18
Within  Argentina’s  federal  structure  all  levels  of  government  are  generally
permitted to borrow both domestically and abroad. During the 1980s  both  levels  of
government  borrowed  extensively,  reflecting  the  weak  fiscal  management  during  the
period.    In  addition,  both  accumulated  sizable  arrears  on  payments  for  wages  and
pensions, to suppliers and for debt service.
19  Lack of  financial  control  prevailed  in
particular  at  the  provincial  level,  becoming  an  important  source  of  financial  and
macroeconomic instability.  In the late 1980s, the provinces accounted for roughly 40%
of  the  deficit  of  the  consolidated  non-financial  public  sector.  These  deficits  were
financed by discretionary ATN transfers and loans from the federal government, but
also by loans from the provincial banks and other parts of the financial system, arrears
to suppliers and delays in wage payments to provincial government employees.
Provincial  banks,  in  particular,  acted  as  captive  sources  of  financing.    The
provincial government banks were considered to be akin to the central  bank  of  each
province: they provided funds to the provincial governments upon demand and, in turn,
received rediscounts from the Central Bank of Argentina.
20  Given their portfolio of bad
assets  (resulting  to  a  significant  extent  from  lending  to  provincial  governments)
provincial banks were among the prime candidates for restructuring and consolidation
that started in 1995.
                                                
17 Also, in a situation of large vertical fiscal imbalances, the workings of local democracy do not induce
prudent fiscal behavior by local authorities.  Saront (1998) studies the electoral impact of fiscal variables
in the Argentine provinces, in comparison with Peltzman’s (1992) study for the U.S. states. In Argentina
(as in the U.S) voters penalize federal spending but (    unlike       the US case) they      reward      local spending.
18 Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) argue that it is very unlikely that credible  commitments against
bailing  out  sub-national  governments  could  be  implemented  in  situations  of  large  vertical  fiscal
imbalances.
19 During the 1990s the federal  government  tried to consolidate those arrears;  the clearance  operation
added up to a total of 9 percent of 1995 GDP.
20 For example, those rediscounts amounted to over 2 percent of annual provincial spending during 1983-
1990.  (Fundación de Investigaciones  Económicas  Latinoamericanas,  1993;  quoted  in  Schwartz  and
Liuksila, 1997).11
By establishing a currency board arrangement, the Convertibility Law of March
1991 ended inflationary Central Bank financing of public sector deficits at all  levels.
This measure was strengthened by an increase in reserve requirements on deposits of
provincial  entities  held  by  provincial  banks.    Several  provincial  banks  have  been
privatized in the last few years.  Also, since 1994, provincial governments are required
to obtain national approval for borrowing in foreign currencies.
Still, while recent changes have reduced the degree of freedom for carrying out
extraordinary financing operations, they have not been sufficient to bring about financial
discipline  at  the  provincial  level.    There  are  no  limitations  on  domestic  currency
borrowing  operations,  and  provincial  governments  have  continued  the  practice  of
pledging future coparticipation receipts as a collateral for borrowing from commercial
banks.  In addition, they have sometimes developed alternative sources of financing. For
instance when faced with a cash crisis in 1995, several provinces issued “coupons” in
lieu of wage payments.
In section IV we interpret this behavior in light of a dynamic common pool game.
We will attempt to interpret  different  institutional  setups  (such  as  the  presence  or
absence of provincial banks) as alternative specifications of the rules of that game.
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One  related  set  of  “transaction  costs”  to  explore,  are  those  that  impede
intertemporal trades with future generations, which are oftentimes the ones to pay the
larger costs of today’s policies. We hypothesize that, in a setting like the one we have
been describing, Ricardian equivalence is broken.
22
3. Perverse Intertemporal Fiscal Behavior
According to standard Keynesian models, fiscal policy should be countercyclical: when
bad times hit, the government should increase government spending and lower taxes to
help the economy “spend” its way out of the recession.  Neoclassical tax-smoothing
models inspired in Barro (1979) imply neutral fiscal policy over the business cycle:  (as
                                                
21 Prud’homme (1995: 206) provides a nice summary of the “Argentine Federal Fiscal Game”:   “The
case of Argentina in the 1980s provides a good illustration of “fiscal perversity” (Perloff, 1985) of sub-
national governments (World Bank, 1990) … [T]he (pre-transfer) fiscal deficit of the provinces in 1986
was  6.2 percent  of  GDP.   This  important  deficit  was  either  financed  by  transfers  from  the  central
government or by borrowing, in both cases inflationary.  Transfers were (at least until 1988) mostly a
posteriori discretionary grants ... This system in practice fostered provincial mismanagement, leading to
a large central budget deficit.  Borrowing by the provincial governments from the Central Bank or from
provincial Banks (entirely controlled by the provincial governments) was also a problem.”  Or  World
Bank (1990: ii):  “These provincial/national financial practices have contributed to unsustainable public
sector fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits, and their continuation would undermine  national efforts  to attain
price stability and to promote sustainable economic development.”
22  “Ricardian  equivalence”  is  a  theory  according  to  which  actors  fully  anticipate  that  increasing
government debt today implies higher taxes in the future, and therefore are indifferent between financing
government spending with taxes or debt. See, for instance Barro (1974); a nice introductory treatment is
given in Mankiw (1994, Chapter  16). It is worth noting that according  to Arnold Harberger  (1998),
Ricardian equivalence fails even in better institutional settings.  Our statement in the text is consistent
with the view of Brennan and Buchanan (1985: 82): “Individual behavior in collective choice is likely to
reflect shorter horizons than comparable behavior in private ... choice ... The person who may be willing
to wait privately, to behave with prudence in order that he or his heirs may secure the fruits of long-term
investment in human or non-human capital may, at the same time, be unwilling to wait collectively ...
because of the necessary attenuation of individually identifiable  rights or shares in the fruits of collective
or governmental ‘investment’ ...”12
a  first  approximation)  constant  spending  and  constant  tax  rates,  implying
countercyclical budget deficits.    The  evidence  for  OECD  countries  appears  roughly
consistent with the neoclassical model, while the evidence for Latin America, including
Argentina, suggests that fiscal policy is  procyclical  (Gavin  and  Hausman,  1997  and
Talvi  and  Vegh,  1997).
23    These  authors  argue  that  this  procyclicality  could  be
attributed to the behavior of multiple fiscal authorities in decentralized settings.
In the case of Argentina, although further explorations are necessary, we have
found  preliminary  evidence  that  fiscal  behavior  at  the  provincial  level  is  highly
procyclical and that this is, in part, caused by the tax-sharing system. As an illustration,
Figure 2 shows the rates of growth of GDP and of aggregate provincial spending for the
last ten years. The two are highly correlated, with provincial spending over-responding
to the fluctuations in output.
In relation to that, many authors have argued that the tax-sharing system makes
fiscal adjustment much harder to attain. Recent evidence is provided by stabilization
efforts  during  the  Alfonsín  administration  (Aizenman,  1998),  and  during  the
Convertibility plan (Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997). In both instances,  faced  with  the
need  to  correct  large  macroeconomic  imbalances,  the  federal  government  introduced
major tax, spending and administrative reforms that succeeded in raising  the  ratio  of
taxes  to  GDP.    Through  these  efforts  at  the  federal  level,  provinces  received  an
automatic revenue windfall via the various revenue transfer mechanisms.  The financial
problems the provinces experienced during the 1995 recession (after the Mexican crisis)
reflected  difficulties  in  cutting  back  expenditures  in  line  with  reduced  transfers,
particularly from coparticipation.
The instability of coparticipation funds seems to have induced fluctuations in
government  consumption  and  a  lack  of  predictability,  which,  in  any  sensible
intertemporal model of the economy, produces welfare losses.
4. Inducing Inefficiencies in the Aggregate Fiscal Mix
The  fact  that  some  taxes  are  shared  and  others  are  not  has  induced  the  federal
government to make some inefficient decisions. As Tanzi (1996)  has  suggested,  this
leads to situations where non-shared taxes acquire greater weight in the tax system, even
when they are less efficient.   
Also,  when  fiscal  adjustment  is  necessary,  the  “optimal  response”  tends  to
include a mix of increased taxation and spending cuts.  Given that the increase in taxes is
partially dampened by transferring 50 % of them to the provinces, this biases the federal
government towards “excessive spending cuts.”  Similarly, at times this has prompted
the federal government to raise import-related revenues.
There has also been a tendency to implement different precoparticipaciones to
“compensate” for changes in taxes or national spending needs.
24
                                                
23 Preliminary work by Braun (1998) indicates that this is even more serious in high-inflation countries,
an important observation for the Argentine case.
24 The Ministry of the Economy is currently attempting a tax reform  that will lower  the (non-shared)
inefficient labor taxes at a time of high unemployment, and raise  shared  taxes.  To compensate,  it is
requesting some amount to be pre-coparticipated to the national government.  One of the major difficulties
faced by the federal government, is the lack of credibility of the estimates about the revenue potential of
the increase in the rates of shared taxes that it produces.13
5. Lack of Achievement of Fair Redistributive Outcomes
The development of the tax-sharing regime over the years has been intimately related to
redistributive efforts.  Many analysts argue that “genuine” redistribution towards the
poorer regions has been mixed with other redistributive ventures, favoring  politically
powerful (needy or not) actors. We provide below three “vignettes” suggesting  such
“deviations.”
Porto and Sanguinetti (1995) show that, even though on average the regime has
redistributed towards poorer regions, more detailed analysis indicates that some richer
provinces  have  benefited  more  than  some  poorer  ones  and  that,  even  among  poor
provinces, the redistributions do not  follow  any  reasonable  indicator  of  fiscal  need.
Table 1, illustrates their point with an example.  The most common poverty indicator in
Argentina is the percent of households with “unfulfilled basic needs” (NBI).  HNBI is
the percentage of total households in that category that reside in each province. Table 1
suggests that actual transfers do not follow the poverty indicator very closely.
Also,  even  though  the  explicit  idea  of  redistribution  is  to  promote  the
development of the poorer regions, this has not happened.  On the contrary, the wedge
between advanced and less-developed regions  has  widened  in  the  last  three  decades
(Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997).
There is also the suspicion among observers and political actors that the true
impact on the personal distribution of income does not follow the regional distributive
pattern. Many regimes are thought to redistribute towards the richer  citizens  of  the
poorer provinces.  An often cited example is the “industrial promotion” (i.e. tax breaks
for businesses in poor provinces) regime.
25  Another suspect is the “national housing
fund” (FONAVI) which does not reach the very poor and has evolved into a mechanism
for subsidizing middle-class housing (Schwartz and Liuksila 1997).
6. Poor Tax Compliance
Tax compliance in  Argentina  is  very  deficient.    For  instance  VAT  compliance  was
estimated to be 34% in 1989 and 55% in 1994, while neighboring countries like Chile
(80%) and Uruguay (70%) have much better compliance rates (Crotty and dos Santos,
1996).
This is not strictly a consequence of the tax-sharing system but there are reasons
to believe that the current regime provides no incentive  for  provincial  authorities  to
collaborate in the enforcement of the collection of the most important (shared) national
taxes.  This is the common pool problem again: why pay the political cost of using local
police  to  close  down  businesses  that  fail  to  pay  taxes  if  there  is  no  connection
whatsoever between how much is collected and how much is received by each province
out of national taxes?
                                                
25 Some preliminary evidence for the Argentine case is provided in Vázquez (1998).  It is likely that some
of  it could be interpreted  in light of  certain  “mental models” (Denzau  and North  1994)  of  regional
development that have been popular in Argentina (it would be fascinating to track down whether some of
the beneficiaries  have  been  involved in the promotion of  such models).  This is reminiscent  of  the
intellectual, economic  and political  dynamics  of  the  import  substitution  regimes  in  Latin  America
(Krueger, 1992, Tommasi and Velasco 1996).14
Tanzi (1996) has pointed out that, historically, four provinces used to have legal
authority to grant exemptions from the national VAT.  At least in the short run, using
their authority was clearly in their best self-interest but resulted in considerable erosion
of VAT revenue and aggravated national fiscal problems (Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997).
Tanzi (1996) also suggests that the attitude of provincial governments has been that
economic stabilization is a national public good and is thus the sole responsibility of the
federal government.
7. Lack of Information and Lack of Incentives to Produce Information 
The current discussions around the possible reform of the tax-sharing regime make clear
that  most  actors  believe  that  there  are  better,  more  rational,  ways  of  designing
intergovernmental  transfers.  In  a  recent  meeting,  there  were  several  statements  by
provincial  governors  complaining  about  the  lack  of  information  on  the  way
coparticipation money is spent in other provinces (Palanza and Sin-Silva 1998).
There is a clear sense that the current regime rewards inefficiency, through some
sort of “ratchet effect”. That is, if a province shows that it can handle its finances with
austerity today, everybody might infer that austerity is not hard to achieve for  that
province and this will hurt the province in tomorrow’s redistribution.
But  then  there  is  little  incentive,  at  the  level  of  one  individual  provincial
government  to  spend  the  effort  and  the  resources  necessary  to  provide  better
information about the costs and technologies for satisfying the different public needs in
that province.
8. Misallocation of Time and Managerial Effort of the Authorities
In allocation schemes  such  as  the  tax-sharing  arrangement  we  have  been  describing,
participants have all the incentives to spend most of their effort and ingenuity trying to
alter the redistributive mechanism in their favor.
26
It is commonplace in Argentina that governors and other local officials  spend
more time in Buenos Aires lobbying for redistribution, than in the province generating,
implementing and monitoring adequate public policies. (This is obviously related to the
poor information incentives described above.)
9. Complexity
The  following  is  a  description  of  the  Argentine  tax-sharing  regime,  taken  from  the
International Monetary Fund  volume  on  federal  fiscal  arrangements  (Ter-Minassian,
1997):
Currently there are three basic mechanisms for revenue sharing between the national and the provincial
level:  (1)  the  coparticipation  scheme,  which  provides  automatic,  non-earmarked  transfers;  (2)  other
automatic transfers, all of which are earmarked for specific purposes; and (3) discretionary (non-automatic)
                                                
26 For an analysis of such behavior in a somewhat more general context that include private businessmen
(in Argentina), see Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994) and De Pablo and Martínez (1989). More general
accounts are  present  in Baumol (1990), Murphy, Shleifer  and Vishny (1991)  and North (1990a)  and
(1990b).15
transfers and grants that may be either earmarked or not.  The detailed structure of the system is shown in
Figure 3.
27   
Accordingly, excise taxes, income taxes, and the VAT (and, before being phased out in 1995,
also the gross assets tax) are subject to revenue sharing under the coparticipation scheme. However, the
provinces receive a certain share of the income tax and the gross assets tax under separate arrangements
prior to the distribution of tax revenue under the coparticipation scheme, just as 11% of VAT revenue is
given to the social security system prior to entering into the coparticipation scheme.  Other taxes, such as
the fuel  tax, the energy  tax,  the  personal  assets  tax,  wage  taxes,  the  import  surcharge  (called  the
“statistical” tax), and charges on insurance premiums are shared according to separate  earmarking  rules
outside the coparticipation scheme.
The coparticipation scheme is currently responsible for around two-thirds of all federal-provincial
transfers.  As shown in Figure 3, there are various other automatic transfers, earmarked for different funds
that are  under  either  the  spending  responsibilities  of  the  provincial  governments  --for  instance,  the
National Housing Fund (FONAVI), the Road Fund, and the Rural Electrification Fund-- or the federal
administration –for example, the Agricultural Technology Institute and the Reinsurance Institute.  They
also include direct transfers to the provinces (from part of the income tax revenue) and the social security
system (from part of the VAT and income tax revenue).
28
Finally, there  are  discretionary  transfers  that are  reimbursable,  at  least  in  principle.    These
include those made  through FONAVI, and Treasury advances  against future  tax revenues.   FONAVI
obtains earmarked resources in the form of  42 percent  of  fuel  tax revenue  (around  1 percent  of  GDP).
These funds  are  lent to the provinces,  which  then  on  lend  the  money  through  provincial  housing
organizations to individuals to finance housing construction (Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997: 399-401).
29
The ever-increasing complexity of an interdependent network of different shared
taxes and of expenditure functions and decision-making bodies renders it impossible for
voters  and  taxpayers  to  identify  which  government  spends  or  taxes  and  for  what
purposes.  This breaks the benefit-tax link that is essential for enhancing efficiency in
the  provision  of  public  goods,  at  the  same  time  that  magnifies  the  problem  of
exploitation of the common pool.
III. The building of the fiscal “labyrinth”
In this section we want to portray the coparticipation labyrinth as endogenous. That is,
to examine it as an outcome of deliberate political activities by the main political actors
over time.
30
Indeed, by looking at the evolution of the coparticipation system over the course
of the 20
th century a series of relevant questions might be raised. For example, why did
Argentina adopt such a tax-sharing scheme? when was it first implemented?,  why was
it so unstable over the years?, to what extent variations in the coparticipation scheme
altered the distribution of shared taxes in favor of either the national government or the
provinces?, how did they change the distribution across provinces?
                                                
27 Figure 3 is a representation of what many observers have dubbed the “Coparticipation Labyrinth.”
Our own construction (based on Ministry of the Interior, 1996; Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997; and Llach,
1997) may well be inaccurate at the time of writing, and will most likely be inaccurate  at the time of
reading.
28 For instance, provinces (excluding the city of Buenos Aires) receive 4 percent of all income tax revenue
directly,  but  they  also  receive  part  of  the  64  percent  of  income  tax  revenue  that  enters  into  the
coparticipation scheme.
29 FONAVI  transfers,  though nominally reimbursable,  are  effectively  non-reimbursable  because  of  low
repayment levels –less than 10% of recovery.  
30 The description of the Coparticipation regime draws from CFI (1996), Fernández and Iacobucci (1998)
and the different  laws and decrees.    The  broader  historical  picture  draws  from  Williamson  (1992),
Berlinski (1969), De Pablo (1984), Torre and De Riz (1993), and Smith (1991). The glimpses into the
political history surrounding the coparticipation  agreements  are  being researched  through  periodicals,
mainly La Nación.  This work is being compiled in Palanza and Sin-Silva (1998).16
In order to provide some answers for all these questions, we first provide a quick
overview of the federal fiscal arrangements from the 1853 Constitution until 1973.  Next
we analyze in some more detail the negotiations around the enacting of the last two
comprehensive Coparticipation Laws, those of 1973 and 1988
31.  
Although this is a first stage in a broader research project, we believe that these
two “episodes” are particularly important  because  they  have  direct  bearings  on  the
current situation.
32  
1. From the 1853 Constitution until the background of the 1973 Law.
The  Argentine  constitution  did  not  originally  provide  for  a  system  of  tax  sharing.
Although it established a federal system of government, the 1853 constitution mandated
for a complete separation of tax sources, with the National Government raising taxes on
foreign trade and “internal” taxes only in the National territories, and almost no transfers
across different levels of government.
This meant that each province had to  adjust  its  spending  to  its  own  budget
constraint, leading to  very  large  disparities  in  the  provision  of  public  goods  across
provinces, given the significant differences in wealth and resources that characterized the
different provinces.  (See Table 2).
The  first  federal  tax-sharing  agreement  originated  in  the  mid-1930s.  Yet,  the
rationale behind its adoption was not precisely to reduce such disparities across  the
different provinces. The main objective was to bolster public finances in the midst of the
international economic crisis, by allowing the national  government  to  collect  internal
taxes.
33
It was also during these turbulent years that another event that would shape the
evolution of the coparticipation regime took place. On 16 September 1930, the military
coup  lead  by  José  Félix  Uriburu  inaugurated  a  period  of  deep  political  instability.
Unstable both semi-democratic and military regimes dominated the political scene for
the next 53 years.
As every tax-related issue, a federal tax-sharing agreement is very sensitive to
political  changes.  Thus,  this  pattern  of  political  instability  profoundly  affected  the
stability of the coparticipation regime.
Throughout these years, the underlying legal  framework of the coparticipation
system  was  repeatedly  altered:  institutions  that  were  put  in  place  by  civilian
governments were subsequently reversed by military regimes and vice-versa. One of the
main reasons is that decision-makers (and political actors in general) were continuously
changing (Presidents – both de  jure  and  de  facto  –,  provincial  governors  –  idem  –,
                                                
31  The  bargaining  dynamics  behind  these  two  processes  is  worth  comparing,  given  that  in  1973
negotiations took place under a military regime, while in 1988 they were held under a democratic one
32 The current situation is, in fact, the origin of our concern.  It is worth noting here that the preliminary
description we provide in this section largely focuses on (primary) coparticipation between “the Nation”
and “the provinces,” which is the easier information to obtain.  Future analyses will put special emphasis
on the issues of distribution across provinces.
33 The Law 12.139 of “Unification of Internal Taxes”, passed  on January  1935, was  indeed, the first
Coparticipation Law. It unified internal taxes, placed their collection under  the national government,
and established the “coparticipation” of its proceeds by the provinces. As part of  the negotiation, the
provinces  committed to eliminate their taxes that were  similar to those that the Nation would  now
collect.17
Congressmen), and consequently there was not a well-defined locus for bargaining over
these issues.
34
The successive laws and decrees that marked the evolution of Argentina’s tax-
sharing system, thus, were oftentimes a way by which the different actors sought to
secure  gains  for  themselves.  Hence,  the  changes  usually  involved  alterations  to  the
criteria for revenue sharing between the federal government and the provinces as well as
among the provinces.
When the power was  more  concentrated  in  the  national  government  (mostly
during military regimes), the changes were intended to shift the distribution of shared
taxes in its favor. This was achieved by different means, such as explicitly changing the
proportion of tax revenues the national government had to share with the provinces, or
in more subtle ways, by introducing new taxes (not to be shared), or increasing the rates
of existing but unshared ones. Still, the most powerful tool in the hands of the national
government  throughout  this  period  was  inflation:  both  military  and  civilian
administrations  repeatedly  used  the  inflation  tax  to  increase  the  national  treasury’s
revenues 
35.
Conversely, with democratic opening, the once again elected provincial governors
and legislators engaged in new debates over the distribution of tax revenues in order to
reverse the changes that were produced during the previous regime. This usually resulted
in modifications to the distribution of shared taxes in the provinces’ favor.
  For example, during Juan Perón first year in office, in 1946, Congress passed
Law 12.956. It established: (a) the unification and expansion of the number of taxes to
be shared (not only income, expected profits and sales, but also extraordinary profits,
previously excluded); (b) an increase in the provinces’ participation in the distribution
of tax revenues from 17.5% to 21% (this represented a 20% growth for 1947).
Similarly, following Arturo  Frondizi’s  election,  in  1958,  Congress  passed  an
important  reform  to  the  law  12.956  of  1947.
36    The  most  important  modification
established by the new Law 14.788, referred to the “primary distribution” for the year
1963: 58% for the federal government, 36% for the provinces and 6% for the capital
city.  This implied a huge change, for the provinces (and the capital) since they doubled
the total shared revenues from 21% to 42%.
37
Thus, as Figure 4 shows, the distribution of the coparticipation revenue between
the nation and the provinces suffered continuous changes during this period of  deep
political instability.
                                                
34 Between 1930 and 1982 twelve presidents (both de jure and de facto) were taken out of office by force:
Yrigoyen in 1930; Castillo in 1943; Rawson also in 1943 (he  could not even  take  office  formally);
Ramírez in 1944; Perón in 1955; Lonardi in 1955; Frondizi in 1962; Illia in 1962; Onganía, in 1970,
Levingston in 1971, María Estela Martínez de Perón in 1976, and Eduardo Viola in 1981. Thus, since
1930 only two presidents completed a whole period in office: Agustín P. Justo (1932-1938) and Perón
(1946-1952).
35  For example, to the inflationary process, the Nation’s share on the income tax revenues increased to
82.5% in 1943, to 90.4% in 1945 and, consequently, the participation of the provinces was reduced from
13% in 1943 to 7.1% in 1946.
36 At that point, Law 12.956 regulated 75% of all shared taxes.  The taxes distributed according to that
law went 79% to the federal government and 21% to the provinces.
37 Interestingly, given that this could generate  adjustment problems to the national finances,  the law
established a linear transition scheme to be implemented from 1959 onward, with the provinces gaining
2% each year. Both in 1964 and 1965, under Arturo Illia’s presidency (1964-1966) this was  extended,
arriving to 54% for the federal government and 46% for the provinces in 1966.18
2.  The Origins, Negotiation and Evolution of Coparticipation Law 20.221 (1973)
As a result of the changes introduced in 1958, the distribution of shared taxes had been
moving very strongly towards the provinces.
In March 1967, under a new military regime, finance minister, Adalbert Krieger
Vasena  put  together  a  stabilization  package  to  clean  up  the  federal  government’s
finances. In order to increase the federal government’s revenues, he unilaterally reduced
the provinces’ coparticipation share from 40% to 35.46% 
38.
The  effects  of  these  cuts  on  the  provincial  finances  were  soon  felt,  and
eventually led to the creation of a Territorial Integration Fund,
39 financed with loans
from  the  national  budget  to  pay  for  imperative  public  investments  in  different
provinces.
In the context of continuing  social  unrest,  wildcat  strikes,  riots  in  provincial
cities and, last but not least, the appearance of urban guerrilla  groups,  General  Juan
Carlos  Onganía  (president  since  1966)  was  deposed  in  June  1970  and  General
Levingston (1970-1971) was appointed as his successor.
40
In March 1971, a new political crisis took place and General Alejandro Agustín
Lanusse  replaced  Levingston.  With  Lanusse’s  appointment,  the  last  phase  of  the
military regime began.
In the view of the new president, it was illusory to think that the military regime
could  be  maintained  without  far-reaching  changes.  He  intended  to  forge  a  national
agreement (“Gran Acuerdo Nacional”) that would lead to a transition to a democratic
setting.  This  strategy  included  legalizing  political  parties  and  calling  for  a  broad
agreement between the military and the political forces. The novelty of this initiative
was that it included the peronist party for the first time since 1955.
41
In terms of the economy, none of the government’s economic teams could tame
the mounting inflationary spiral, and monthly inflation rates started to range from 5 to 9
percent.  In this increasing inflationary process, which lowered tax revenues and hence
coparticipation,  the  provinces  started  to  suffer  a  new  worsening  of  their  financial
situation.  In  addition,  a  national  policy  of  wage  equalization  across  all  levels  of
government  had  been  passed  in  1971.  This  measure  had  increased  the  spending
obligations of the provinces.
                                                
38 With this measure, the federal government’s share increased from 54% to 59.22%. A new reduction in
1968 increased the national government’s part to 61.88%.
39The name of this fund evokes one of the mental models (that of attempting to equalize the density of
population and activity across  the territory)  whose  origins and conceptual  underpinnings need  to  be
investigated.
40 Four months later, Aldo Ferrer was appointed as minister of economy. As Torre and De Riz point out,
his ideas were “diametrically opposed to those of his predecessors and linked to the ideology of the UN
Economic Commission for  Latin America  (ECLA)  and favorable  to the fortification  of  the  state  and
national industry” (1993: 309). Ferrer gained his reputation as a structuralist economist with his 1963
book La Economía Argentina: las etapas de su desarrollo y problemas actuales. As Stephen Haber
recently pointed out, the book, an overview  of  the country’s economic  history, was  written without
including a single statistical table (1997:8). With regard  to his economic  policy, a nice  summary is
provided by Filippini and Olcese (1989)
41 Some conditions were imposed on the participation of the Peronist party (Torre and De  Riz, 1993:
310-11; Smith, 1991:189-223).19
As a consequence of this situation, the federal government  had  to  implement
some sort of financial relief for the provinces. This was made in the form of ATNs
(Contributions  from  the  National  Treasury).  The  relationship  between  these
contributions and the coparticipation revenues increased from 7.5% in 1970 to 56.8% in
1971 and 88.3% in 1972. Thus, the national treasury moved from financing 2.4% of
provincial spending in 1970 to 24% in 1972. This was a crucial step towards a more
discretionary allocation of funds, and it is probably one of the turning points in the
history of federal fiscal relations in Argentina.
In this context of great dependence of the provinces with respect to the National
Treasury, an adjustment of the financial relations between them was necessary. Two
months  before  the  upcoming  elections  in  January  1973,  the  military  government
presented a project for a new Coparticipation Law.   After that, a process of intense
negotiations started.
One of the most interesting aspects of this episode that requires further study, is
the motivation of the outgoing military regime, to spend so much effort to set up this
Coparticipation Law. The military government, afraid of the political consequences of a
Peronist  triumph  (which  was  almost  certain),  thought  that  the  more  conservative
political forces concentrated in the provinces should have enough bargaining potential to
cushion the impact of Perón’s return to power (Botana and Mustapic, 1991). Thus, we
conjecture that a strategy of restoring the financial autonomy of the provinces through
the coparticipation regime was adopted with the intention  of  endowing  conservative
provincial forces with more resources and, therefore, increasing their future bargaining
power.
42
Palanza  and  Sin-Silva  (1998)  describe  the  very  interesting  dynamics  of  the
negotiations, in  which  a  sequence  of  provinces  was  “bought”  into  the  law  through
different favors from the federal government.
43  In the first days of March 1973, the
final negotiations to obtain a consensus around the project were made. Finally, on 11
March (the very same day the national elections were taking place), an agreement with
the province of Buenos Aires (a key actor in the coparticipation system) was reached.
According to the newspapers of the time, the basis for the agreement was that no
province would receive, in absolute values, an amount smaller than the one given to them
until then. Strictly speaking, the agreement went further  and  the  federal  government
yielded part of its resources. In the end, both the provinces and the federal government
received the same percentage in the primary distribution (48.5%), after a 3% deduction
from the total amount collected destined to a Regional Development Fund that would
give continuity to the Territorial Integration Fund regime. In regard to the secondary
distribution,  there  were  some  advances  in  the  technical  aspects.  Discretionary
                                                
42 A similar strategy was adopted by the government with the electoral reform of 1972 (law 19.862), that
politically overrepresented the smallest provinces through malapportionment in the Chamber of Deputies.
See Botana and Mustapic (1991).  According to Jones (1998), the Argentine Congress presents the worst
case of malapportionment in the world.  See also Jones (1995, 142) for further evidence.
43 Due  to space  constraints we  do not describe  the dynamics in detail here.   One  of  the  important
questions to analyze, are the incentives of the “governors” at the time of the outgoing military regime.  It
seems that, even  though under  a different  institutional game, they attempted to act  on behalf  of  the
provinces in a way not that dissimilar from what constitutional authorities would have done.20
mechanisms of resource allocation gave  way to the use of three allocation criteria  to
calculate each province’s share of the coparticipated funds:
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a)  25% according to a development gap (defined as the difference between each
province’s wealth with respect to the most developed one): to compensate
for the relative weakness of the tax base of the less developed provinces; i.e.,
a compensation of fiscal capacities.
b)  10%  according  to  demographic  dispersion:  to  consider  the  low  density
provinces’ s higher costs of providing public goods and services.
c)  65%  according  to  population:  linking  the  provision  of  provincial  public
services to the number of inhabitants.
The above  mentioned  Regional  Development  Fund,  amounting  to  3%  of  the
coparticipation (contributed by both the federal government and the provinces, although
the  former  initially  claimed  that  it  should  be  completely  integrated  with  provincial
resources)  was  destined  to  finance  public  works  of  provincial  or  inter-provincial
interest. The allocation of these funds was in the hands of the national authorities.
Another innovation of the agreement was the broadening of the definition of the
national taxes to be shared, including not only the existing taxes, but also those that
could be created by the Nation (according to article 67, inc. 2 of the Constitution) in the
future. In exchange, the provinces committed to the elimination of local taxes analogous
to those included in the coparticipation.
On  March  22,  Law  20.221,  one  of  the  milestones  in  the  history  of
coparticipation, was officially announced.
In 1976, after a short period of peronist government marked by chaotic internal
struggles, uncontrollable political polarization and serious economic mismanagement, a
new military coup, the “Process of National Reorganization”, took place.
In spite of  this  significant  political  change,  Law  20.221  remained  essentially
unchanged until 1980.
45 In 1980, Law N° 22.293, changed the coparticipation primary
distribution again. The main reason was the implementation of a tax reform intended to
promote the creation of new jobs. This change instituted a corporate tax break through a
reduction in labor taxes and, therefore, meant an increase in the total  amount  of  the
collected  taxes  to  be  shared.  This  shrinkage  was  supposed  to  be  covered  by  a
generalization of  the  VAT  also  included  in  the  law,  yet,  differences  between  these
calculations and the taxes actually received led the federal government to give  transfers
to provinces to compensate them for these losses.
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Still, even though during the 1980s the primary distribution of  coparticipated
revenue was still based on the 1973 legal  regime (except for the referred changes), by
1983 several “pre-coparticipation” arrangements had reduced the effective share of the
coparticipated revenue going to the provinces to 29%. According to Porto this reflected
                                                
44 It is interesting to mention that the final drafting of the law occurred in a council of provincial finance
ministers.  Ten reasonable indicators were discussed.  The final decision to adopt these three was due to
the complexities involved in defining, measuring and monitoring under a more detailed regime (Palanza
and Sin-Silva, 1998).
45 The only change in the 20.221 law occurred in 1975, when the implementation of the Value  Added
Tax (VAT) generated a somewhat complicated special prorate that caused changes in that year’s primary
distribution, which was 39,8 % for the federal government and 60,2% for the provinces.
46As this paper is being written, the national government’s ministry of economy is making a tax reform
proposal that is similar in nature to the one that failed in 1980. Some of the political difficulties it faces
are precisely due to that fact that it alters the mix between shared and non-shared taxes.21
a type of “latent” conflict between the provinces and the federal government, kept quiet
only because under the military government’s institutional framework the provinces had
no political autonomy. (1990, XII).
Given that Law 20.221 was supposed to expire on 31 December 1983, intense
negotiations between the provinces and the central government took place in the final
months of the military government. Yet, in stark contrast with 1973, they never reached
a satisfactory agreement and decided to prolong the Law 20.221 one more year, leaving
its future treatment to the upcoming constitutional authorities.
3. The Origins, Negotiation and Evolution of Coparticipation Law 23.548 (1988)
In 1973 the initiative was taken by the national government, which had to give up things
in exchange for this law.  In 1988 it was an imposition of (some of) the provinces in
exchange  for  support  for  a  tax  reform  package  urgently  needed  by  the  national
government.
By 1984 the 1973 regime had expired. Therefore, 1985 saw the absence of a legal
regime for “coparticipating” tax revenue between the federal and provincial levels. All
transfers  to  the  provinces  were  channeled  under  the  form  of  National  Treasury
Contributions  (ATN).  In  practice,  as  Schwartz  and  Liuksila  note,  each  province
“negotiated bilateral agreements with  the  federal  government”  (1997:  401,  emphasis
added).
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Nonetheless, both the provinces as a whole and the federal government sought
the enactment of a definitive norm, and during that year began a series of negotiations
that led to a transitory Financial Agreement for 1986. This agreement was signed on
March 13, 1986, and established the coparticipation shares for that year on the basis of
the 1985 period.
This  led  to  a  substantial  reduction  in  the  share  received  by  the  federal
government. Yet, not all the provinces increased their share in the same proportion. The
financial agreement changed the allocation criteria of the 1973 Law (to 30% development
gap,  30%  demographic  dispersion,  and  40%  population),  and  therefore  the  poorer
provinces were benefited at the expense of the most advanced ones (Buenos Aires, Santa
Fé, Córdoba and Mendoza).
At the same time, a pervasive inflationary process, a key characteristic of the
Argentine economy of this period, prevailed. In  1985,  a  heterodox  stabilization,  the
Austral Plan, was launched. Although it initially succeeded in controlling inflation, by
the third quarter of 1986, the average consumer and wholesale price indexes was growing
at a monthly rate of 7.6%.
In the September 1987 congressional elections, the president’s party, the UCR,
suffered an important defeat to the peronists. The latter staged an impressive political
comeback in  Congress  and  also  took  control  of  17  of  22  provincial  governorships,
including Buenos Aires, whereas the radicals retained control of only two provinces,
Córdoba and Río Negro.
On the other hand, given the country’s critical economic situation, the need to
implement economic adjustments was compelling. With inflation rates above  25%  in
                                                
47  According  to  Sanguinetti  (1993)  during  this  period  political  factors  played  a  dominant  role  in
allocating transfers across provinces. Cf. Schwartz and Liuksila (1997).22
both  July  and  August,  with  an  IMF  cancellation  of  undrawn  loans  from  previous
negotiations  and  the  continuing  net  drain  of  capital  abroad,  Alfonsín’s  government
enjoyed very little maneuvering room (Smith, 1991: 284).
In that setting, the government entered into negotiations for the approval of a tax
reform bill in order to attain fiscal adjustment. The project included a new emergency tax
on agricultural products, an increase in bank transactions taxes (known as the “tax on
checks”), a modification of the tax on net assets, a national tax on property, a forced
savings tax and an increase in the gasoline tax. Prospects for the approval of the tax
reform bill by Congress, where the UCR did not have majority in either chamber, were
not good. In order to get it, thus, the UCR had to negotiate with other forces, specially
the peronists. It was in this context that the negotiations for the new coparticipation law
came up.
The tax reform project underwent several stages of negotiation. The negotiations
started  with  a  broad  agreement  between  President  Alfonsín  and  the  Buenos  Aires
governor and peronist leader Antonio Cafiero. At this stage, the key players were the
members of Alfonsín’s economic team, UCR legislators and members of the peronist
party that responded to Cafiero. Following this round of negotiations the tax reform
package was modified for the first time, producing a considerable loss to the  federal
government’s estimated collection base (a reduction from 3% of the GNP to 2.4%).
Also at this stage, the new coparticipation law was negotiated.  Since  Buenos
Aires had a privileged status in the negotiations, and given that due to the 1986 financial
agreement  its  coparticipation  share  had  shrunk,  Cafiero  had  a  strong  interest  in
augmenting it again.
48 On the other hand, the rest of the peronist governors wanted to be
sure that with the new law they would have a fixed percentage of the shared taxes in the
future. At this point, the project for a new coparticipation law started to become the
outcome  of  a  series  of  negotiations  between  the  peronist  governors.  The  existing
provincial parties, with the exception of the Movimento Popular  Neuquino,  did  not
participate in this stage of the negotiations.
In  this  context,  Alfonsín  and  his  economic  minister  Sourrouille,  adopted  a
strategy of brinkmanship by threatening to print money in case the tax reform was not
approved in Congress. This constituted a serious challenge to the  provincial  leaders,
since the inflationary tax, obviously, would not be shared.
This placed the negotiations around the coparticipation in a new stage, inside the
Peronist Party’s National Council, which consisted of the key leaders of each district.
Here  the  claims  were  mainly  related  to  the  funds  that  would  be  destined  to  the
provinces. The discussions ranged from the debate over the allocation criteria that were
going to be used in the law, to a more immediate demand to include the funds deriving
from the tax reform package in the coparticipation’s primary distribution.
The  peronist  governors,  as  a  block,  tried  to  obtain  the  most  they  could  in
exchange for their necessary support. On the one hand, each one tried to obtain relative
improvements for his/her own province. On the other hand, they wanted to get enough
funds in order to face financial difficulties until the new taxes started to be collected.
In the last stage of negotiation of the law even the unions got into the debate.
Given their political representation in Congress within the peronist party, union leaders
                                                
48 The previous Buenos Aires loss occurred under a Radical administration in the province.23
conditioned their support for the tax reform approval to the passing of a series of laws
related to labor.
49
Finally  both  tax  reform  and  coparticipation  bills  were  approved.  The
coparticipation  law,  N°  23.548  was  passed  on  7  January  1988.  It  stipulated  that
56.66% of shared revenue accrued directly to  the  provinces,  with  an  additional  one
percent allocated for distribution to them in the form of ATNs, while the  remaining
42.34%  was  retained  by  the  central  government.  With  respect  to  the  secondary
distribution,  instead  of  adopting  any  kind  of  objective  criteria  to  calculate  each
province’s share of the coparticipated funds, the law tended to validate the share that
each province had obtained in the 1985-1987 period through a quantitative coefficient
that constituted a sort of  “magical  number”.  As  Porto  notes,  the  adoption  of  such
“numbers” has no explanation whatsoever in the law or in  the  parliamentary  debate
(1990).
As  Alfonsín’s  government  was  coming  to  an  end,  the  country  started  to
experience a new episode of raging  hyperinflation.  From  August  1988  through  July
1989, consumer prices soared 3,610% and wholesale prices skyrocketed 5,062%.
In this context, on 14 May 1989, the peronist candidate  Carlos  Menem  was
elected president. To everyone’s surprise, he implemented a comprehensive economic
restructuring program. In March 1991, as part  of  the  stabilization  efforts,  Congress
enacted the Convertibility Law that established a currency board  arrangement.
50  The
implementation of the Convertibility Plan, as it  became  known,  yielded  satisfactory
macroeconomic results.  The Convertibility Law also ended inflationary central  bank
financing of public sector deficits at all levels. Inflation plummeted and growth averaged
more than 8% between 1991 and 1994, only to fall to 4.6% in 1995, largely in reaction
to the Mexican peso crisis.  Still, despite these significant economic changes, the main
features of  the  23.548  coparticipation  law  prevailed.
51  In  order  to  coordinate  these
reform  efforts  between  the  national  and  sub-national  levels  of  government,  two
successive fiscal pacts were negotiated in 1992 and 1993.
A key change under the first of these federal-provincial fiscal pacts was to set
aside 15% of tax revenues subject to coparticipation for the special financing of social
security  payments,  the  administrative  costs  of  collecting  shareable  taxes,  and  an
emergency fund for provinces suffering from fiscal disequilibria.  As a result, the share
of coparticipated revenues allocated to the provinces was reduced from 57.7% to 49%.
Although  the  coparticipated  revenue  retained  by  the  federal  government  was  also
formally reduced (from 42.3% to 36%), the federal government was a net gainer (since
the national social security system is part of the federal public sector).
                                                
49 In fact, three of these laws were approved, at a cost eventually too high for the government.  Especially,
the one governing collective bargaining had an impact on the escalating inflationary process. It is worth
mentioning that the Radical government lacked credibility in the eyes of the Unions, unlike its successor.
(See Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998a and 1998b, and Palermo and Novaro  1996 for  insights on the
“Nixon goes to China” strategy of Menem vis-à-vis the Peronist unions.). Interestingly, nowadays  in
1998, the (now Peronist) government is involved in trying to modify some of those labor laws, at the
same time that it is trying to pass a tax reform,  and while the  new  Constitution  mandates  a  new
Coparticipation Law.
50 Domingo Cavallo was the (strong) finance minister at the time.
51 Although the law established this coparticipation  regime  for  1988, it was  extended  every  year  ever
since (paradoxically this transitory regime has been the most stable one in years).24
On the other hand, despite this setback for the provinces, the pact did include a
guarantee  on  the  part  of  the  federal  government  that  it  will  distribute  among  the
provinces at least US$ 725 million per month 
52.
This first pact originated in an agreement between  President  Menem  and  the
governors. Congress by means of Law 24.130 afterwards ratified it. In Eaton’s (1997)
view, although negotiated, the pact  was  more  favorable  to  the  national  government.
First, because the pact ratified two decrees that were previously enacted by the federal
government’s  decrees  (559/92  and  701/92)  deducting  the  administrative  costs  of
collecting shareable taxes. Second, because the US$ 43.8 million for the emergency fund
were subtracted by the executive branch from revenues that would have been distributed
among the provinces according to the existing criteria, replacing them with new criteria
53.
In  1993,  a  new  fiscal  pact,  denominated  “Federal  Pact  for  Employment,
Production and Growth”, was signed, in an attempt to carry the reforms a step further,
by  reforming  provincial  tax  systems.    Provinces  adhering  to  the  pact  committed
themselves to eliminate local taxes on gross income, on stamps, on electric utilities, and
on gas and fuel consumption. They also pledged to reduce property taxes, to privatize
their companies and to derogate municipal rates that duplicated provincial taxes.
In exchange  for this, the federal  government  committed  to  condone  the  $900
million debt the provinces had with the Nation and to reduce labor taxes. After a series
of negotiations, and given the reluctance of the governors to sign the Pact, the federal
government agreed to elevate the guaranteed minimum transfers from $725 million to
$740 million.
Initially the provinces were slow to join this second pact. Yet, by August 1993,
sixteen of them had signed it, and after being ratified by Congress in the 1993 budget
law, it was converted into law.
In 1994 a Constitutional reform promoted by President Menem in order to allow
for his reelection took place. Beyond the intentions that motivated the reform process,
the new Constitution included important aspects related to the coparticipation scheme.
The revised constitution established that a new coparticipation law, on the basis
of agreements between the central government and  the  provinces,  had  to  be  drafted
before 1996. It also established temporary clauses. First, the distribution of services and
functions that at the moment of the constitutional reform sanction were performed by
the  provinces  could  not  be  modified  without  their  approval.  Second,  the  effective
distribution of resources adopted in the future law could not be less for each province
than the amount received at the time the constitutional reform took place.
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IV. A Transaction-Cost Politics Approach to Study the Development of the
Argentine Tax-Sharing Agreement
                                                
52 The provinces also attained an automatic mechanism for  the transfers  of  FONAVI  and other special
programs.
53 Actually, Eaton claims that it was this last move what, in turn, maximized the executive’s ability to
get governors sign into the pact.
54 The two “Pactos Fiscales” as well as the constitutional convention of 1994 are the current focus of our
research.  The story clearly suggests the importance of short-term political strength, as well as the attempt
to attain the consolidation of “property rights”, in a process that looks very amenable to be interpreted in
a transaction-costs perspective.25
The brief history of the evolution of the coparticipation scheme presented in section III
had the purpose of suggesting the existence of high transaction costs in political markets
that oftentimes prevent the achievement of efficient solutions.
An important assumption of our reasoning is that instead of “coparticipation”
being  a  pure  redistribution  game,  some  transactions  among  political  actors  may
potentially have generated benefits for all concerned. The evidence presented in section
II on the current system’s inefficiencies buttresses this supposition.
From  a  transaction-cost  theory  of  politics  the  argument  would  be  that  the
political actors tended to overlook policies and institutions that could have been Pareto-
preferred to the existing arrangements.
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The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  attempt  to  identify  the  relevant  political
transaction costs that beset exchanges between political actors in the particular context
of  the  Argentine  coparticipation  system.  We  attempt  to  “unbundle”  the  blanket
category of  “transaction costs” into some salient components.
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1. The Frequency of Political Interactions.
Political bargains are usually difficult to sustain. The problem is that the enforcement of
political agreements depends on trust in their execution. Thus, when it is difficult to
enforce agreements, political actors do not find it worthwhile to cooperate.
On the other hand, as “folk theorems” in game theory suggest, under repeated
interaction certain norms of reciprocity allow trust and cooperation to develop. Thus, if
an institution can secure political agreements by reducing uncertainty and transaction
costs,  it  will  make  it  possible  to  capture  the  gains  from  exchange.  The  case  of  a
legislature  such  as  the  United  States  Senate  is  usually  seen  in  the  literature  as  an
illustration of this (Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Krehbiel,
1991).
Yet, there is a problem that limits the workability of this solution: turnover. In
the case of the US Congress, as Axelrod notes, “the chance of two members having a
continuing interaction has  increased  dramatically  as  the  biennial  turnover  rates  have
fallen from about 40 percent in the first forty years of the republic to about 20 percent
or less in recent years” (1984: 16).  The case of Argentina is radically different: due to
the recurrent political instability, the turnover rate of political actors was extraordinary
high. For instance, for executive positions at the national level, in the 55 years between
1928 and 1983, Argentina had 26 Presidents and 60 economic ministers. That is a change
in President every 2 years and in economic authorities every 11 months.
Moreover, with the succession of military  regimes,  the  Congress,  the  natural
arena for political bargains to be carried on, was closed during extended periods of time
(40% of the time between 1928 and 1983).
                                                
55 This is particularly the case when we incorporate the citizens as primary political actors to the analysis
(see subsection 7 below).
56 The (formidable) task of developing a definite set of categories or typical elements that a transaction
cost analysis should have is extremely ambitious, and is beyond the scope of this paper.  This section is
in part an application of the logic and style of reasoning of transaction cost analysis to some of the most
relevant aspects of the story summarized in the previous section; and in part an agenda for future research.26
Even  in  democratic  periods,  turnover  rates  have  been  extremely  high.  For
example, the number of legislators that arrived to Congress for the fist time was 55%
(Chamber of Deputies) and 40% (Senate) in 1934 and 1935 respectively, whereas in
1983, 93% of the deputies and 82% of the  senators  were  “rookies”  (Panosyan  and
Goretti, 1986). Today, after 15 years of sustained democratic regime, the turnover rate
is still very high: 77 percent of the members of the chamber of deputies serve only one
term (Jones 1996; Saiegh 1997).
2. Uncertainty and Influence: The Coparticipation Scheme as an Incomplete Contract.
In the presence of a complex and dynamic environment, an agreement that calls for the
future  collection/distribution  of  the  fiscal  revenues,  such  as  Argentina’s  tax-sharing
scheme, must be incomplete. That is, for an institutional arrangement of this type it
would be impossible (or too costly) to specify in advance and in detail what actions the
parties would have to take in all possible future contingencies.
What were the consequences of this incompleteness? Essentially, that because
perfectly specified and freely enforceable agreements could not be written, the process
of negotiation never really ended and power relations at any moment in time mattered
exceedingly.  Uncertainty played a major role in structuring the different coparticipation
bargains  throughout  the  years.  These  negotiations  were  made  on  an  ad-hoc  basis,
without a consistent political arena for the negotiations  (sometimes  they  took  place
inside and sometimes outside Congress), and without a stable legal framework.
This led political leaders to make efforts to increase the probability of reshaping
the rules of the game in their favor instead of producing managerial innovations in the
provision of public goods. In doing so, they spent  valuable  resources  attempting  to
influence  the  decisions  on  coparticipation.
57    Lack  of  information  and  hidden
information were resources that political leaders frequently used to influence decisions
to their benefit and allowed them to enjoy rents.
In this context, the  different  jurisdictions’  political  resources  played  decisive
roles  in  establishing  the  size  and  characteristics  of  the  coparticipation  scheme  and
particularly in determining its redistributive features. When the distributions deviated
from those mandated by objective criteria and depended on the distribution of political
power,  the  (most  active)  participants  of  the  coparticipation  game  started  to  enjoy
“surplus” or rents. Thus, differences in political power among the provinces, such as the
political overrepresentation of the smaller ones in Congress, can  help  to  explain  the
existence of some  “funny”  redistributive  components  of  the  coparticipation  scheme
(Porto, 1990; Porto and Sanguinetti, 1996; and Piffano, 1998).
3. The “Argentine Federal Fiscal Game”
                                                
57 Thus, the behavioral patterns developed in this context were  efficient  at making the coparticipation
scheme as a whole even more inefficient. We do not wish to blame or tag as irrational  every  political
leader with this argument. On the contrary, their maximizing activity resulted from learning by doing and
investing in the kind of skills and knowledge that paid off.  A government official told the authors, that
for a provincial leader it paid off much more to know the exact timetable of the flights to Buenos Aires –
in order  to extract  resources  from  the national government--  than  either  to  know  the  details  of  tax
administration in the province, or to supervise the behavior of the provincial tax-collection agency.27
Several  authors  have  provided  game-theoretic  formalizations  of  the  common-pool
problem in  decentralized  macroeconomic  settings;  for  instance  Aizenman  (1993  and
1998),  Aizenman  and  Isard  (1993),  Mondino,  Sturzenegger  and  Tommasi  (1996),
Tabellini (1986).  These papers present non-cooperative games in which independent
authorities choose spending levels as in a Cournot-Nash game, and aggregate outcomes
such  as  excessive  spending,  large  deficits  or  inflationary  finance  (depending  on  the
economic model) obtain.  In all  of  these  cases,  the  emphasis  is  on  non-cooperative
outcomes, as if cooperation through repeated interaction is not obtained.  We know that
when the conditions for cooperation through repeated play are not met, there is still
hope of attaining better outcomes  than  those  of  the  non-cooperative  Nash,  through
institutional design and/or self-imposed constraints. One way of achieving that would be
to endow one player (say, the national government) with commitment capabilities-- for
instance, not to finance (ex-post) expenditures above a pre-specified limit.
Sanguinetti (1994) presents an interesting model,  motivated  by  the  Argentine
experience,  which  captures  some  of  these  features.  There  are  a  number  of  local
governments and a central government  engaged  in  deciding  their  respective  spending
levels, to be financed out of national taxation.  He analyzes three regimes: cooperative,
non-cooperative  and  “commitment.”  In  the  latter,  the  national  government  is  a
Stackelberg leader who sets the tax rate before the simultaneous spending choices of all
players. This regime leads to welfare outcomes superior to the non-cooperative  case
(although inferior to the cooperative one).
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We could interpret the history of fiscal federalism in Argentina as moving back
and forth along the line between the commitment regime and the non-cooperative one.
For instance, we interpret the hardening of the national budget constraint through the
Convertibility Law in 1991 (which forbade the Central Bank from printing money) as a
step towards the commitment regime.  Complementary steps were the privatization of
several  provincial  banks.  Further  commitment  could  be  achieved  through  some
mechanisms that would require extraordinary majorities in order to approve assistance
to provincial governments that run into financial crises.
The “game” we are describing is further complicated by the fact that the player
“Nation”  is  not  just  a  “benevolent  central  planner”  but  also  a  self-interested
opportunistic actor.
4.  Lack of Credible Commitment by the Federal Government (or The “Schizophrenic”
Role of the National Congress)
As it is well known, the history of (fiscal federalism in) Argentina is plagued by mutual
mistrust between “the center” and “the provinces.” In the last few decades, one of the
central axes of that conflict was the battle between  the  Federal  government  and  the
provincial governments over the distribution of fiscal obligations and resources.
                                                
58  Sanguinetti  and  Tommasi  (1998)  extend  that  framework  and  consider  the  role  of  idiosyncratic
economic shocks to the provinces.  They show that, under asymmetric information, welfare comparisons
present several trade-offs among different institutional setups.  For instance, a “lax” fiscal regime may offer
some advantages in terms of its risk-sharing properties.28
It is clear that in the  “game”  across  provinces,  the  national  government  is  a
potentially efficient institution onto which they can delegate powers as a way of solving
some of their collective action problems.  But at the same time, being an actor with its
own interests, it faces serious credibility problems.
59  Indeed, the  history  has  many
instances in which this power has been abused.
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The potential federal abuse of discretionary authority is a political equivalent of
the  hold-up  problem  in  transaction-cost  economics.    Given  the  federal  government
agencies’  inability  to  commit  to  a  future  course  of  action,  potentially  valuable
transactions  between  provincial  and  national  leaders  may  never  take  place.  This  is
magnified by the fact that oftentimes, the federal government can “move” faster than the
provinces due to their collective action problems.
This “conflict” has been mediated and  or  exacerbated  by  several  institutions.
One such institution is the National Congress (when it has been in operation), and its
interactions with the national executive and with provincial governments.
5. The Entangling of Efficiency and Distribution
To return to one of the themes mentioned in the introduction, we believe that the story
we  are  trying  to  understand  can  be  conceptualized,  to  some  extent,  as  a  story  of
inefficient redistribution.  The world is a very complex environment and the political
actors will, in general, not be fully informed about the exact distribution of  possible
effects that a particular measure or arrangement will have on their welfare.  When we
combine this with all the conflicts of interests and commitment problems just described,
it makes clear that there is ample room for the strategic manipulation of information:
both about “facts” and about “mappings.”
The story of  “Coparticipación”,  as  well  as  the  broader  history  of  economic
policy in Argentina, is full of instances in which superficially plausible (but erroneous)
arguments were made to justify particular redistributive policies and mechanisms.
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6. Mental Models and Ideology
There  have  been  several  crucial  turning  points  and  several  unrealized  trades  in  the
history summarized in the previous section, which can only be understood by reference
to the “mental models” that the actors had at the time. The notion of “mental models”
                                                
59 The main reason is that there is an agency problem: the actors that embody the “National” interest
(President, congressmen,  bureaucrats,  national party organizations, etc.)  are  not  perfect  agents  of  the
people. Citizens actually live in one of the 24 sub-national jurisdictions (the story was slightly different
before the “provincialization” of  all federal  territories).  This is also an instance  of  a common-agency
problem, as mentioned in subsection 7.
60 On top of that “Bayesian” reason there is a Nation-Province “mental model” that hinders the building
of trust.  (See subsection 6).
61 One example have been the numerous “industrial promotion” schemes, tax exemptions for  particular
industrial ventures in particular regions, which were  peddled  as instruments for  regional  development.
Preliminary evidence about the politics of their inception and economic  and political consequences  in
Argentina is provided in Vázquez (1998).29
(internal  representations  that  individual  cognitive  systems  create  to  interpret  the
environment) is exposited in North (1990b) and Denzau and North (1994).  
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One  example  is  the  perennial  preoccupation  with  the  uneven  geographical
distribution of population, wealth and economic activity.  This is one of the “ideas” one
would need to trace down from its  justifiable  origins,  to  the  excesses  and  mistaken
policies later committed in its name.
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7.  Principal-Agent Problems
We believe that the Argentine federal fiscal relations provide a nice playground for a
transaction-cost politics approach because the different political jurisdictions constitute
“natural” players.  This led us to put (perhaps too) much emphasis on the “games”
across political units, as if they were unified political actors in which politicians act as
perfect agents for their constituencies.  However, that  is  certainly  not  the  case;  we
believe  that  “agency  problems”  are  pervasive  in  the  political  history  of  Argentina.
Precisely those agency problems, coupled with imperfect voter (or  “principal”  more
generally) information, are at the crux of the transaction costs we emphasize.
In particular, political situations like the ones we have been describing belong to
the class of “common agency” problems (Bernheim and Whinston 1986, Dixit 1996).
One  general  conclusion  of  models  with  multiple  principals  is  that  the  power  of
incentives are very much weakened (an excellent application to the control of politicians
by citizens through electoral mechanisms is Ferejohn 1986).
8.   The Inflation Link
It is no discovery that the economic and political history of Argentina has been marked
by inflation. The extremely high  and  unstable  inflation  history  of  Argentina  in  this
century has had important bearings on the distribution of total tax revenues (inclusive of
inflation tax) across jurisdictions, especially between the nation and the provinces.  At
the same time, inflation has been, to some extent, an outcome of the federal fiscal game
we are analyzing.  It operated sometimes as ex-post “closure” of the system, softening
the aggregate budget constraint, and sometimes as a strategic weapon in the hands of the
national government.
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One  of  the  features  to  explore  in  the  future  is  the  strategic  delay  in  the
transferring of the collected taxes to the provinces, which in periods of high inflation
                                                
62 Professor North suggested that we further investigate the evolution of some mental models behind the
history of fiscal federalism in Argentina, a task that we hope to accomplish in future work.  Shumway
(1991) provides a good account of some of the “guiding fictions” in Argentine history.
63 It is worth mentioning that “the achievement of an equivalent  level of  development  throughout the
national territory” was enshrined in the 1994 Constitution as one of the objectives of the coparticipation
regime to be created.
64  A  telling  episode  occurred  during  the  discussions  in  1987  of  what  is  the  current  Ley  de
Coparticipación.    The  Alfonsín  government  was  cornered  economically  by  the  pressure  of  the
International Monetary Fund, and politically by the peronist opposition. Hence, it utilized the threat of
inflating the economy as a last resort in order  not to concede  even  further  in the negotiations around
coparticipation, tax reform, and labor laws (Palanza and Sin-Silva, 1998).  A recent paper relating federal
structures to inflation outcomes is Treisman (1998).30
might have substantially changed the real primary distribution.  This might have been
behind the provinces’ preoccupation with institutionalizing the “automatic mechanism”
of payments (now in place).
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A  related  feature  of  inflationary  processes,  of  particular  importance  for  a
transaction-cost story, is that inflation complicates  all  type  of  nominal  calculations,
increasing the cost of transacting.  (See for instance Joskow 1974 for a transaction-cost
approach to the effects of inflation on regulation).
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It remains for future research to explore the multiple links between the (federal)
fiscal history and the monetary history of the country.  We conjecture, that through this
transaction-cost  politics  analysis  one  might  be  able  to  identify  some  structural
characteristics of the Argentine case that lead to such an unusual inflation history, a task
that, in spite of its obvious importance, has not been adequately resolved.
9.  “Pre-coparticipaciones”
One of the salient dimensions of Nation-provinces conflict in recent times has been the
use by the central government of the idea of “pre-coparticipaciones”; that is, amounts
which are subtracted from the pool of coparticipation funds, for some particular use
(oftentimes related to spending responsibilities of the federal government).
This  “trick”  clearly  represents  an  instance  of  “ex-post”  renegotiation  with
respect to previous agreements. Its use has intensified after 1988, which is further proof
of the current system’s inadequacy.
10.   Provinces - Municipalities
Most of the economic arguments about the virtues of decentralization seem to apply
better to smaller units such as municipalities or localities than to units of the size of the
typical Argentine province.  
On the other hand, there are possibly some “politico-economic” arguments that
may call for a “provincial” structuring of countries; perhaps along the lines of Weingast
(1995) and (1997); see also Inman and Rubinfeld (1997).
It is obvious that the evolution  of  “federations”  such  as  Argentina  does  not
necessarily respond to any sort of “optimal design”, but it  is  in  large  part  history-
dependent.
67  It would be worthwhile to explore these issues in our transaction-cost
framework.
                                                
65 This emphasis might have  distracted  from  more rational discussion about the “fundamentals”  that
should guide the tax sharing agreement.  For some thoughts on market applications of the same problem,
see Tommasi (1993 and 1998).  Similar features appear also in the Brazilian case (CEPAL 1998, p 122.)
66 In this area it is hard to establish causality, but the date of approval of the national budget is positively
correlated with inflation (i.e., the budget was approved later in years  of  higher inflation;  see  Molinelli
1991, Chapter 9, Table 9).
67 A particular aspect of this in Argentina relates to the fact that the “country” was originally “designed”
as if the central economic activity would be the mineral exploitation of  present-day  Perú.  That factor
tended to generate a politico-bureaucratic structure in the northwestern provinces, which has turned out to
be dysfunctional  in light of  the subsequent economic  evolution.  (See  for  instance  Sawers  1996 and
Cortés Conde, 1974)31
11. The mixing of long and short-term considerations in the negotiations
Several of the episodes described in section III (for instance the discussion of the 1973
Law,  and  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1994)  reflect  the  fact  that,  short-term
(sometimes circumstantial) considerations  impinged  upon  the  institutional  outcomes.
We  hypothesize  that  some  characteristics  of  the  Argentine  political  environment
sometimes induced political leaders to act in (socially) myopic ways.
This could possibly be a general characteristic of “the politics of institutional
choice”,  relating  to  the  differing  horizons  of  many  actors,  which  deserves  special
analysis in the transaction-cost view of politics.
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V.   Conclusions:
Some preliminary thoughts on institutional engineering
We have argued in this paper that the argentine political actors made a collection  of
choices that produced a tax-sharing system that, in the view of all experts is clearly
inefficient.
We  also  claimed  that  since  the  political  bargains  around  the  coparticipation
scheme were made over time, were difficult to specify in advance, and involved different
people at different times, political actors could  not  make  credible  commitments  and
thus, potentially valuable transactions between them never took place. Thus, the issues
of information and of intertemporal enforcement played a key role in precluding them
from moving towards more efficient outcomes.
We believe that these inefficiencies are remediable (at least, in part).
69 We are
attempting to propose a governance structure that will try to minimize the incidence of
the  main  transaction  costs  described.  Some  work  in  progress  along  those  lines  is
summarized in Iaryczower, Saiegh  and Tommasi (1998). In this section we present a
brief sketch of some of the suggestions for the establishment of a set of institutional
arrangements that would allow the main actors to bargain with each other and reach a
more efficient allocation of fiscal resources.
Such a proposal involves a trade-off between rules (i.e. a stable framework that
would make it possible to avoid costly ruptures and discontinuities) and flexibility (i.e.
an institutional arrangement that would allow for the introduction of improvements, and
that would have the capacity to adjust to changed circumstances).
Given Argentina’s past experience, the new institutional framework should be
lasting. Hence, it will be able to create a propitious atmosphere so that the involved
actors  could  make  decisions  in  a  foreseeable  setting,  and  concentrate  themselves  in
managerial  efforts  instead  of  involving  into  continuous  bids  for  the  resources’
distribution. On the other hand, it would also be commendable if this  enduring  legal
framework had the necessary flexibility to adapt itself to (a) changes in the economic
and social structure of the country, and also in the public policies chosen by the elected
                                                
68  A “Coasian principle” would call for separation of short-term from long term considerations (in the
spirit of “constitutional political economy”; see Brennan and Buchanan, 1985 and Elster and Slagstad,
1988).
69 This stands in contrast with the general theoretical view of Oliver Williamson (1996).32
politicians; and (b) scientific, technical and informational advances, that would allow an
improvement in the provision of the public services.
Therefore, the “governance structure” we have in mind is one that at the same
time would allow the Argentine political actors to deal with on-going problems as they
arise and yet provide a degree of durability to the whole coparticipation scheme. At this
point it is worth reflecting on the convenience of introducing flexibility in this way or in
another form, for example with a legal framework with a predetermined duration, that
should be replaced in turn by another institutional arrangement. The Argentine historical
experience indicates that the latter  could  lead  to  a  series  of  partial  solutions  (often
incoherent with each other), incessant conflicts, and actually, to the very same labyrinth
we  are  trying  to  leave  behind.  From  a  social  choice  perspective,  such  institutional
“flexibility” can lead to very volatile outcomes because the size of the set of points that
can defeat the status quo is usually quite large.
As a result of  the  political  bargains  that  were  held  during  the  constitutional
reform process, the new Constitution calls, in its article 75, for the creation of a federal
fiscal institution to oversight and control the execution of the coparticipation regime in
the future. Although the constitutional mandate is rather  vague  with  respect  to  this
institution, we believe that it should secure political agreements by reducing uncertainty
and transaction costs.
From our point of view, thus, the role of this governance structure, should be
twofold: On the one hand, to reduce the chance that viable policies are overlooked, either
because they are not considered or because information on their viability is misleading.
On  the  other  hand,  its  role  should  be  to  ensure  that  the  enforcement  of  political
agreements would be executed.
To fulfill these two goals at the same time, the proposed institution should have
very strong technical capacities (to generate good information) and should be able to
make decisions that are political in nature.  Therefore,  we  believe  it  will  have  to  be
conformed by a Technical Committee (TC) composed by experts in fiscal matters and a
Federal  Fiscal  Assembly  (FFA)  integrated  by  the  political  representatives  of  each
jurisdiction  (for  instance,  the  ministers  of  economy  of  the  provinces  and  of  the
Nation).
70  This  way,  whereas  the  TC  makes  policy  recommendations,  the
implementation of these policies would be finally decided by the FFA. On the other
hand, the FFA should not be able to make decisions if these are not based on the TC’s
analysis.
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With regard to the FFA decision making process, whether to support or reject
the TC’s policy recommendations, different voting rules (unanimity, special majorities,
simple majority rule) and different voting procedures (open rule, germane  rule,  close
                                                
70 The “governance structure”  suggested is similar to the institutional setting in place  in  Australia.
(Australia, like Argentina, is characterized by a relatively large vertical fiscal imbalance.)  The “CT” we
are referring to is in some respects  analogous to the Australian  Commonwealth Grants  Commission,
which reports to a Premier Conference  (analogous  to our suggested “FFA”).  See Craig (1997)  for  a
description of the Australian federal fiscal system.
71 Given that the TC will produce  the information  from  which the FFA members  should base  their
decisions, the design of the TC must seriously consider such aspects as the selection and removal of its
members, its financing, etc. The objectives of the federal fiscal institution could be weakened completely
if -- as it has often happened in Argentina -- the technical body is not conformed by people who are: (a)
able to develop such a complex task; (b) absolutely independent of the interests involved (in this case the
different jurisdictions); and (c) at the same time accountable to the FFA members.33
rule) could be used to decide on different issues regarding the coparticipation regime. For
example, the FFA could be able to  introduce  changes  in  the  coparticipation  scheme
following a proposal made by the TC by a simple majority vote, while any change that
had not been proposed by the TC should be done by a unanimous decision. Or -- stated
in the positive political theory jargon -- the TC could be the “agenda setter” and then the
FFA will take a vote on such proposals under a closed rule procedure. That  is,  the
Assembly would approve or reject each proposal, and thus, in the case of a rejection,
the status quo would remain.
Our research is still preliminary. Further work is needed in order to establish
who should be the “first mover” in each one of these situations, and to study in more
depth the “game” that would unfold after the players make their respective proposals.
Ideally,  and  after  conducting  an  in-depth  analysis,  we  would  like  to  provide  some
recommendations with respect to voting rules and procedures in the  FFA,  the  most
desirable sequence of moves, etc.
In  any  case,  the  main  idea  that  is  guiding  these  preliminary  thoughts  on
institutional  engineering  is  that  under  a  federal  fiscal  institution  with  these
characteristics,  political  actors  would  delegate  the  technical  aspects  to  a  technical
committee (taking advantage of its expertise and conserving on scarce resources of time,
staff and energy), and at the same time there will be an institutionalized context  for
political bargaining over fiscal matters.
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Distribution of Transfers  & the number of
Households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (HNBI)
Transfers HNBI Abs Dif.
Buenos
Aires
24.04 37.30 -36%
Catamarca 2.55 1.05 143%
Chaco 4.26 4.69 -9%
Chubut 1.90 1.33 43%
Córdoba 7.82 7.06 11%
Corrientes 3.55 3.59 -1%
Entre Ríos 4.52 3.33 36%
Formosa 3.23 2.27 42%
Jujuy 2.70 2.68 1%
La Pampa 2.00 0.67 199%
La Rioja 2.98 0.84 255%
Mendoza 4.02 3.86 4%
Misiones 3.19 4.06 -21%
Neuquén 1.99 1.33 50%
Rio Negro 2.59 2.00 30%
Salta 3.63 4.51 -20%
San Juan 3.07 1.47 109%
San Luis 2.26 0.98 131%
Santa Fe 7.95 8.12 -2%
Santa Cruz 1.99 0.46 333%
S. del Estero 3.85 3.60 7%
T. del
Fuego
1.45 0.35 314%
Tucumán 4.43 4.45 0%
Source: Porto and Sanguinetti (1995)TABLE 2: PRESIDENTS AND MINISTERS OF ECONOMICS
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J. FIGUEROA ALCORTA 02/12/1906 09/11/1910 PAN N. PIÑERO
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(UCR ANTI-
PERSONALISTA)
P. GROPPO
F. PINEDO
S. ORÍA
C. A. ACEVEDO
397
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J. D. PERÓN 06-04-1946 09-19-1955 P.J. R.A. CEREIJO
P. J. BONANNI
1697
E. LONARDI 09-21-1955 11-13-1955 MILITARY E. J. FOLCINI 54
P. E. ARAMBURU 11-13-1955 05-01-1958 MILITARY E. A. BLANCO
R. VERRIER
A. KRIEGER
VASENA
300
A. Frondizi 05-01-1958 03-28-1962 U.C.R.I. E. D. DEL CARRIL
A. C. ALSOGARAY
R. T. ALEMANN
C. COLL BENEGAS
J. WEHBE
280
J. M. GUIDO 03-29-1962 10-12-1963 U.C.R.I.
MILITARY-
MILITARY-
J. WEHBE
F. PINEDO
A.C. ALSOGARAY
E. MÉNDEZ DELFINO
J. A. MARTÍNEZ DE
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A. ILLIA 10-12-1963 06-28-1966 U.C.R.P. E. A. BLANCO
J. C. PUGLIESE
495
PRESIDENTS TERM IN OFFICE POLITICAL
PARTY
MINISTERS OF
ECONOMICS
AVERAGE DAYS
IN POSITIONJ. C. ONGANÍA 06-29-1966 06-08-1970 MILITARY J. N. SALIMEI
A. KRIEGER VASENA
J. DAGNINO  PASTORE
480
R. M. LEVINGSTON 06-18-1970 03-23-1971 MILITARY C. MOYANO LLERENA
A. FERRER
139
A. A. LANUSSE 03-26-1971 05-25-1973 MILITARY A. FERRER
J. A. F. QUILLICI
C. LICCIARDO
J. WEHBE
198
H. A. CÁMPORA 05-25-1973 07-13-1973 P.J. J. GELBARD 49
R. A. LASTIRI 07/13/1973 10/12/1973 P.J. J. GELBARD 91
J. D. PERÓN 10/12/1973 07/01/1974 P.J. J. GELBARD 262
M. E. M. DE PERÓN 07/01/1974 03/24/1976 P.J. J. GELBARD
A. G. MORALES
C. RODRIGO
P. J. BONANNI
A. CAFIERO
E. MONDELLI
105
J. R. VIDELA 03/24/1976 03/28/1981 MILITARY J. A. MARTÍNEZ DE
HOZ
1826
R. E. VIOLA 03/09/1981 12/21/1981 MILITARY L. SIGAUT 268
L. F. GALTIERI 12/22/1981 06/17/1982 MILITARY L. SIGAUT
R. ALEMANN
95
R. B. BIGNONE 07/01/1982 12/10/1983 MILITARY J. DAGNINO  PASTORE
J. WEHBE
263
R. R. ALFONSÍN 12/10/1983 07/08/1989 U.C.R. B. GRINSPUN
J. V. SOURROUILLE
J. C. PUGLIESE
J. RODRÍGUEZ
509
C. S. MENEM 07/08/1989 - P.J. M. A. ROIG
N. RAPANELLI
A. ERMAN GONZÁLEZ
D. F. CAVALLO
R. FERNÁNDEZ
647*
References:
MILITARY  PERIODS
(FOLLOWING COUPS)
  *     Calculated on the basis of days in office until 05/20/1998  (3.239)
Sources:
§ De Pablo, Juan Carlos (1984) Política Económica Argentina.  Ediciones Macchi. Buenos Aires.
§ Rodolfo C. Rossi. “El Informador Público” (s/f)
§  Revista IDEA, Nº142, May, 1990
§  Floria, C.A. y García Belsunce, C.A (1992) Historia de los argentinos II.  Ed. Larrouse. Buenos Aires             TABLE 3
Argentina's Growth Rates, Average
Annual GDP and Per Capita GDP
Year Population GDP Per Cap. GDP
1900-05 2.9% 8.8% 5.7%
1906-10 4.7% 5.8% 1.0%
1911-13 4.9% 3.5% -1.3%
1914-18 2.2% -0.9% -3.1%
1919-25 4.0% 8.0% 3.8%
1926-29 2.9% 5.7% 2.7%
1930-35 2.4% 0.3% -2.0%
1936-40 1.7% 2.7% 1.1%
1941-45 1.7% 2.6% 0.9%
1946-50 2.2% 5.0% 2.7%
1951-55 2.0% 3.0% 1.0%
1956-60 1.7% 3.0% 1.2%
1961-65 1.6% 4.4% 2.8%
1966-70 1.5% 4.3% 2.8%
1971-75 1.7% 2.9% 1.2%
1976-80 1.6% 2.3% 0.6%
1981-85 1.6% -1.9% -3.4%
1986-90 1.5% 0.0% -1.4%
1991-95 1.4% 6.0% 4.6%
Source: "Remaking the Argentine Economy", Felipe de
la Balze; 1995 data: Ministerio de Economía and INDECTABLE 4
Population and Area
                   Population, in %                          Area
1895 1947 1991 Km
2 (000)
Buenos Aires 23% 28% 39% 307.6
Catamarca 2% 1% 1% 102.6
City of BsAs 17% 19% 9% 0.2
Chaco 0% 3% 3% 99.6
Chubut 0% 1% 1% 224.7
Córdoba 9% 10% 8% 165.3
Corrientes 6% 3% 2% 88.2
Entre Ríos 7% 1% 3% 78.8
Formosa 0% 1% 1% 72.1
Jujuy 1% 1% 2% 53.2
La Pampa 1% 1% 1% 143.4
La Rioja 2% 1% 1% 89.7
Mendoza 3% 4% 4% 148.8
Misiones 1% 2% 2% 29.8
Neuquén 0% 1% 1% 94.1
Rio Negro 0% 1% 2% 203.0
Salta 3% 2% 3% 155.5
San Juan 2% 2% 2% 89.7
San Luis 2% 1% 1% 76.7
Santa Fe 10% 11% 9% 133.0
Santa Cruz 0% 0% 0% 243.9
S. del Estero 4% 3% 2% 136.4
T. del Fuego 0% 0% 0% 21.6
Tucumán 5% 4% 4% 22.5
Total (Millions) 4.0 15.3 32.6 2780.4
Source: Cuaderno de Economía de la Prov. de Bs.As., N. 15TABLE 5
Per Capita GDP in Argentina's Provinces
1996 pesos
1953 1959 1965 1968 1970 1980
Buenos Aires 5159 5416 7452 7619 7265 6763
Catamarca 1881 2362 2368 2637 3137 4508
City of BsAs 9404 11523 12675 14212 18326 23409
Chaco 3493 3399 4387 3663 3385 4335
Chubut 7792 8412 8148 8937 11475 16300
Córdoba 3869 4782 5919 6373 6109 7456
Corrientes 2472 2823 3482 4176 4705 5462
Entre Ríos 3385 3745 4109 4469 6026 6329
Formosa 3117 2535 2577 2784 3632 2861
Jujuy 4030 4321 3621 3883 4871 5896
La Pampa 5642 7835 8914 7692 8420 11098
La Rioja 2149 2420 2437 2637 3137 3641
Mendoza 5320 5473 6477 7106 8173 8323
Misiones 2579 1959 2995 3223 3467 3988
Neuquén 3654 3572 4318 5275 8585 15779
Rio Negro 5427 4955 6407 8425 7430 7630
Salta 3171 3399 3900 4542 4705 4769
San Juan 3547 4091 4805 4322 4210 4769
San Luis 2687 3399 4457 4249 5779 6936
Santa Fe 4836 5704 6964 6813 7842 8843
Santa Cruz 9297 11638 20405 20512 12795 13525
S. del Estero 2149 1959 2159 2124 3302 3555
T. del Fuego 11392 12560 14067 15824 10401 21328
Tucumán 3493 3572 2855 3223 5448 6503
Source: Own estimation based on Porto (1990) and Elías (1993)TABLE 6a
Provincial Government Expenditures per Capita
In 1996 pesos
1900 1916 1934 1960 1970 1980 1986 1991 1995
Advanced 96.6 93.6 181.7 226.7 395.3 605.8 551.6 525.8 715.0
Intermediate 50.3 67.6 145.1 240.2 421.1 754.8 943.4 778.2 1036.5
Low Density 
1 n.d. n.d. n.d. 360.9 1013.6 1495.7 2156.0 1484.2 2031.4
Poor 
2 18.9 39.2 66.0 236.3 428.4 823.1 1008.8 951.9 1092.9
1 1960 Low Density's average doesn't
include Tierra del Fuego
2 1900 - 1934 Poor's average doesn't include Chaco,
Formosa y MisionesTABLE 6b
Provincial Government Expenditures per Capita
In 1996 pesos
1900 1916 1934 1960 1970 1980 1986 1991 1995
Advanced 96.6 93.6 181.7 226.7 395.3 605.8 551.6 525.8 715.0
Buenos Aires 113.1 99.1 182.9 220.9 342.7 552.1 441.3 434.8 605.2
City of BsAs 126.8 110.2 222.8 215.5 466.6 815.4 628.1 744.4 914.7
Córdoba 33.6 58.9 112.9 259.2 392.7 545.5 633.0 609.1 837.5
Mendoza 67.3 117.7 263.1 307.7 596.1 661.2 851.6 542.4 907.7
Santa Fe 70.7 72.3 138.6 199.0 423.7 626.3 729.5 612.9 792.4
Intermediate 50.3 67.6 145.1 240.2 421.1 754.8 943.4 778.2 1036.5
Entre Ríos 55.3 70.4 119.8 228.4 435.9 665.9 842.5 746.7 1102.3
Salta 27.0 47.0 86.8 232.4 374.8 792.6 1273.9 851.8 893.0
San Juan 48.8 49.5 335.1 317.0 542.2 1161.9 1072.1 961.3 1395.9
San Luis 28.2 42.2 85.4 346.2 479.1 1014.2 1152.3 1064.1 1365.1
Tucumán 64.3 87.8 127.2 197.9 361.3 559.8 686.7 594.0 841.8
Low Density 
1 n.d. n.d. n.d. 360.9 1013.6 1495.7 2156.0 1484.2 2031.4
Chubut n.d. n.d. n.d. 345.4 867.2 1225.5 1602.8 1112.6 1429.2
La Pampa n.d. n.d. n.d. 373.1 790.7 1432.1 1663.1 1298.3 1785.4
Neuquén n.d. n.d. n.d. 291.4 892.0 1502.5 2632.2 1762.6 2532.4
Rio Negro n.d. n.d. n.d. 223.3 928.0 1068.2 1516.8 1023.9 1405.2
Santa Cruz n.d. n.d. n.d. 1013.6 1771.7 2718.4 3995.5 2706.5 3287.9
T. del Fuego n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 3777.1 5368.8 5877.1 3067.1 3941.8
Poor 
2 18.9 39.2 66.0 236.3 428.4 823.1 1008.8 951.9 1092.9
Catamarca 21.5 25.4 28.7 357.7 576.3 1110.8 1437.8 1347.5 1520.9
Chaco n.d. n.d. n.d. 212.4 365.0 828.3 913.5 801.0 929.9
Corrientes 6.9 44.7 61.4 293.2 435.6 692.5 893.0 724.7 779.6
Formosa n.d. n.d. n.d. 166.9 499.5 1013.7 1517.2 1428.9 1547.2
Jujuy 49.1 61.1 132.7 249.7 458.8 944.4 954.4 1182.1 1281.7
La Rioja 22.7 23.4 41.4 268.5 608.6 1348.1 2249.3 2087.4 2438.0
Misiones n.d. n.d. n.d. 212.9 368.1 648.8 759.1 622.7 841.3
S. del Estero 24.4 35.1 68.5 185.0 393.7 711.0 754.2 809.0 905.3
1 1960 Low Density's average doesn't include Tierra
del Fuego
2 1900 - 1934 Poor's average doesn't include
Chaco, Formosa y MisionesTable 7. Governorships held by political party: 1983-1995
Political Party 1983-1987 1987-1991 1991- 1995
Partido Justicialista 12 (54.5%) 17 (77.5%) 14 (60.7%)
Unión Cívica Radical 7 (32%) 2 (9.0%) 4 (17.3%)
Movimiento Popular Neuquino 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.4%)
Pacto Autonomista Liberal 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.4%)
Partido Bloquista 1 (4.5%) 1 (4.5%) --
Acción Chaqueña -- -- 1 (4.4%)
Movimiento Popular Fueguino -- -- 1 (4.4%)
Partido Renovador de Salta -- -- 1 (4.4%)
Total 22 (100%) 22 (100%) 23 (100%)
       Source: Jones (1996)Table 8. Congressional Terms 1932-1976
Chamber
of
Deputies
Constitutionally
Established Term
Actual
Term
Senate Constitutionally
Established Term
Actual
Term
1 1932-1934 1932-1934 1 1932-1935 1932-1935
2 1932-1936 1932-1936 2 1932-1938 1932-1938
3 1934-1938 1934-1938 3 1932-1941 1932-1941
4 1936-1940 1936-1940 4 1935-1944 1935-1943*
5 1938-1942 1938-1942 5 1938-1947 1938-1943*
6 1940-1944 1940-1943* 6 1941-1950 1941-1943*
7 1942-1946 1942-1943* 7 1946-1949 1946-1949
8 1946-1948 1946-1948 8 1946-1952 1946-1952
9 1946-1950a 1946-1952 9 1946-1955a 1946-1952
10 1948-1952 1946-1952 10 1949-1958a 1946-1952
11 1952-1955b 1952-1955 11 1952-1955b 1952-1955
12 1952-1958b 1952-1955* 12 1952-1958b 1952-1955*
13 1955-1961b 1955-1955* 13 1955-1961b 1955-1955*
14 1958-1960 1958-1960 14 1958-1961 1958-1961
15 1958-1962 1958-1962 15 1958-1964 1958-1962*
16 1960-1964 1960-1962* 16 1958-1967 1958-1962*
17 1963-1965 1963-1965 17 1961-1970 1961-1962*
18 1963-1967 1963-1966* 18 1963-1966 1963-1966
19 1965-1969 1965-1966* 19 1963-1969 1963-1966*
20 1973-1977c 1973-1976* 20 1963-1972c 1963-1966*
21 21 1966-1975 1966-1966*
22 22 1973-1977c 1973-1976*
* Military Interruption, Congress closed.
a Unification of terms. Terms for deputies were enlarged, and reduced for senators.
b Unification of terms. 6 year term for both deputies and senators.
c 5 year term for both deputies and senators.
Source: Panosyan and Goretti (1986: 24).FIGURE 1:  Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
Own Revenues as a % of spending by each province
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Coparticipable Taxes and Coparticipation
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